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Binary rewriting is the foundation of a wide range of binary analysis tools
and techniques, including securing untrusted code, enforcing control-flow integrity,
dynamic optimization, profiling, race detection, and taint tracking to prevent data
leaks. There are two equally important and necessary criteria that a binary rewriter
must have: it must be robust and incur low overhead. First, a binary rewriter must
work for different binaries, including those produced by commercial compilers from
a wide variety of languages, and possibly modified by obfuscation tools. Second, the
binary rewriter must be low overhead. Although the off-line use of programs, such
as testing and profiling, can tolerate large overheads, the use of binary rewriters in
deployed programs must not introduce significant overheads; typically, it should not
be more than a few percent. Existing binary rewriters have their challenges: static
rewriters do not reliably work for stripped binaries (i.e., those without relocation
information), and dynamic rewriters suffer from high base overhead. Because of this
high overhead, existing dynamic rewriters are limited to off-line testing and cannot
be practically used in deployment.
In the first part, we have designed and implemented a dynamic binary rewriter
called RL-Bin, a robust binary rewriter that can instrument binaries reliably with
very low overhead. Unlike existing static rewriters, RL-Bin works for all benign
binaries, including stripped binaries that do not contain relocation information. In
addition, RL-Bin does not suffer from high overhead because its design is not based
on the code-cache, which is the primary mechanism for other dynamic rewriters
such as Pin, DynamoRIO, and Dyninst. RL-Bin’s design and optimization meth-
ods have empowered RL-Bin to rewrite binaries with very low overhead (1.04x on
average for SPECrate 2017) and very low memory overhead (1.69x for SPECrate
2017). In comparison, existing dynamic rewriters have a high runtime overhead
(1.16x for DynamoRIO, 1.29x for Pin, and 1.20x for Dyninst) and have a bigger
memory footprint (2.5x for DynamoRIO, 2.73x for Pin, and 2.3x for Dyninst). RL-
Bin differentiates itself from other rewriters by having negligible overhead, which
is proportional to the added instrumentation. This low overhead is achieved by
utilizing an in-place design and applying multiple novel optimization methods. As
a result, lightweight instrumentation can be added to applications deployed in live
systems for monitoring and analysis purposes.
In the second part, we present RL-Bin++, an improved version of RL-Bin,
that handles various problematic real-world features commonly found in obfuscated
binaries. We demonstrate the effectiveness of RL-Bin++ for the SPECrate 2017
benchmark obfuscated with UPX, PECompact, and ASProtect obfuscation tools.
RL-Bin++ can efficiently instrument heavily obfuscated binaries (overhead aver-
aging 2.76x, compared to 4.11x, 4.72x, and 5.31x overhead respectively caused by
DynamoRIO, Dyninst, and Pin). However, the major accomplishment is that we
achieved this while maintaining the low overhead of RL-Bin for unobfuscated bina-
ries (only 1.04x). The extra level of robustness is achieved by employing dynamic
deobfuscation techniques and using a novel hybrid in-place and code-cache design.
Finally, to show the efficacy of RL-Bin in the development of sophisticated
and efficient analysis tools, we have designed, implemented, and tested two novel
applications of RL-Bin; An application-level file access permission system and a se-
curity tool for enforcing secure execution of applications. Using RL-Bin’s system
call instrumentation capability, we developed a fine-grained file access permission
system that enables the user to define separate file access policies for each applica-
tion. The overhead is very low, only 6%, making this tool practical to be used in
live systems. Secondly, we designed a security enforcement tool that instruments
indirect control transfer instructions to ensure that the program execution follows
the predetermined anticipated path. Hence, it would protect the application from
being hijacked. Our implementation showed effectiveness in detecting exploits in
real-world programs while being practical with a low overhead of only 9%.
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There are several reasons why it is desirable to instrument or modify code that
is directly executed in deployment, ranging from application performance monitor-
ing (APM) [1], resource monitoring [2], security policy enforcement [3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
vulnerability patching [8], dynamic information flow tracking [9], and performance
optimization [10, 11, 12, 13]. Taken together, these form important sectors of the
software industry: for example, the application performance monitoring market
alone is a $3.5B/year market, and security policy enforcement on low-level is also a
multi-billion dollar market.
There are two types of code that is directly executed in deployment: 1. In-
terpreted code and 2. Binary code. Interpreted code is the code that executes only
in a software run-time interpreter (also known as an execution engine.) Examples
include Java bytecode, Python code, C# bytecode, and Javascript code. Instrument-
ing or modifying such code is straightforward: most language interpreters provide
methods to trigger user-specified actions when certain types of code instructions or
library calls are executed. Using this capability, entire industries have arisen for
instrumenting interpreted languages, such as in application performance monitoring
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and security policy enforcement. This instrumentation and modification capability,
along with language-level advantages such as portability and modularity, are the
reasons why interpreted languages have become so popular in practice.
However, binary code (also known as machine code) has remained stubbornly
widespread. Binary code is the code that executes directly on the hardware using
machine code instructions. Binary code can theoretically be produced from any
language, but is typically produced not only from older languages like C, C++,
Fortran, and Cobol; but is also often produced from popular modern languages
such as Go, Erlang, VisualBasic, Swift, and Objective C.
Binary code is especially predominant in two types of code: IP-protected code,
and high-performance code. First, IP-protected code is code that is sold by compa-
nies to outside parties. Companies in nearly all cases want to protect their intellec-
tual property, so they do not want to reveal their source code to their customers or
third parties. Unfortunately this rules out most interpreted codes – many interpreted
codes used in deployment either are source code, such as Python or Javascript; or
source code can be easily recovered from them, such as from Java and C++bytecodes.
As a result, interpreted languages are very common for internally used code at com-
panies, as well as cloud-based code, but is nearly absent in distributed commercial
codes. For example, nearly all programs that come pre-packaged on a new laptop,
as well as most commercial programs that customers download and buy, are binary
code. Such distributed, IP-protected code is the most widespread use of binary code
today. Second, high-performance programs such as those in the domains of image
processing, financial transactions, machine learning, and scientific simulation codes
2
are often deployed in binary to ensure the highest execution speed.
It is important to gain the same benefits of instrumentation and modification
mentioned above for binary code that interpreted languages have long enjoyed. To
do so, we need a tool that can instrument and modify binary code, namely, a binary
rewriter.
In general, the reason for the great interest in research in binary rewriting is
that it offers many additional advantages over compiler-produced optimized binaries:
 Inter-procedural Optimization Capability. Although compilers, in theory, can
do whole-program optimizations, the reality is that they often do not. Many
commercial compilers – even highly optimizing ones – limit themselves to
the separate compilation, where each function (and sometimes each file) is
compiled in isolation. For example, GCC, the most widely used open-source
compiler used commercially, compiles each function in isolation even with the
highest optimization level. Research papers have presented whole-program
optimizations, but in limited contexts, with much remaining to be done. Bi-
nary rewriters always have access to the complete application, including li-
braries. Recognizing the deficiency regarding whole-program optimization in
commercial compilers and research, existing rewriters have proposed many
whole-program optimizations. They have demonstrated promising results on
even highly optimized binaries [14, 15] without excessive run-time. Having
the ability to rewrite arbitrary binaries will give external innovators the flex-
ibility to improve upon the offerings of commercial whole-program compilers
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– something they cannot do today.
 Extended Economic Feasibility. It is cheaper to implement a code transfor-
mation once for an instruction set in a binary rewriter rather than repeatedly
for each compiler for the instruction set. For example, the ARM instruction
set has over thirty compilers available for it, and the x86 has a similarly large
number of compilers from different vendors and different source languages.
The high expense of repeated compiler implementation usually cannot be sup-
ported by a small fraction of the demand.
 Source Language and Compiler Compatibility. A binary rewriter works for
code produced from any source language by any compiler.
 Security Enforcement Capability. A binary rewriter that can rewrite binaries
without relocation information can insert security checks into the binary. This
is not the case for a compiler since a malicious developer can avoid the security
checks by merely using a non-trusted compiler without security checks.
 Hand-coded Assembly Support. Code transformations cannot be applied by a
compiler to hand-coded assembly routines, since they are never compiled. In
contrast, a binary rewriter can transform such routines.
In this dissertation, we have designed and developed RL-Bin, a dynamic binary
rewriter which is capable of rewriting all benign binaries with very low overhead.
RL-Bin will find use in implementing a variety of applications of binary rewriting.
For example, researchers have proposed binary rewriting-based methods for securing
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untrusted code [5, 16, 17], enforcing control flow integrity [18, 19], protocol reverse
engineering [20, 21], implementing software transactional memory [22], binary ran-
domization [23, 24, 25, 26], preventing control flow attacks [2, 27, 28, 29], automated
vulnerability repair [8, 30], profiling and race detecting tools [31], memory tracing
to identify cache inefficiencies [32], automatic program parallelization [33, 34, 35,
36, 37], and taint tracking to prevent sensitive data leaks [38, 39, 40]. Taken to-
gether, binary rewriting technologies offers great existing features, and an almost
unlimited future of yet-undiscovered opportunities, bounded only by the creativity
of researchers.
Figure 1.1 shows some of the use cases of RL-Bin. In Chapter 8 we have
designed and implemented prototypes of some of these use cases.
The Probl m: Instrumenting programs
























Figure 1.1: Applications of Binary Rewriters
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1.2 Criteria and Trade-Offs in Building a Binary Rewriter
There are two equally important and necessary criteria that a binary rewriter
must have: it must be robust, and it must incur low overhead. First, a binary rewriter
must work for different type of binaries, including those produced by commercial
compilers from a wide variety of languages, and possibly modified by obfuscation
tools. Second, the binary rewriter must be low overhead. Although the off-line use
of programs, such as in testing and profiling, can tolerate large overheads, the use
of binary rewriters in deployed programs must not introduce significant overheads;
typically, it should not be more than a few percent [41].
Unfortunately there is no existing method today to modify all benign binary
code in a manner that is both robust and low overhead. To understand why, consider
that there are two types of binary rewriters: static vs. dynamic. Static rewriting
refers to approaches which take an executable binary program as input, and without
running it, produce another (rewritten) binary program as output that has the same
functionality as the input program, but is enhanced in some way, for example in
improving its run-time, memory use, or security. Dynamic rewriters change the
binary code during its execution, but never produce a binary program as output.
Instead they modify the binary code in memory, either in-place, or in a copy of the
code memory.
Static rewriters are not robust. Static rewriters can have very low over-
head, but are not robust – they often do not work for certain types of benign
programs, including those containing dynamically generated code, self-modifying
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code, and obfuscated work. As our related work section details, 24% of commercial
benign programs we measured had dynamically generated code, and 1% had obfus-
cated code. Several schemes do not even work for simpler programs with indirect
branches whose targets cannot be statically determined, especially for stripped bina-
ries (i.e. those without relocation information). Stripped binaries are predominant
in commercial third-party binaries. What is worse is that for all existing rewriters,
they cannot predict beforehand if they will work or not – they just simply stop
working without warning. When that happens, the program may crash, or it may
work, but without the enhancements in the modified binary code.
Dynamic rewriters have high overhead. In contrast, dynamic rewriters
are robust, but have high overheads, usually ranging from 20% to several hundred
percent. Dynamic rewriters are robust because they discover all code at run-time.
However, they incur high overhead since most of them maintain a code cache, where
rewritten copies of code blocks are stored and executed from. Maintaining a code
cache results in high overheads not only from the copying of code, but from the
requirement to translate code addresses that are targets of control transfer instruc-
tions, since those CTI targets now need to be changed at run-time because they are
now executed from a copy of the code, instead of the original code.
As a result of the drawbacks, there is no rewriter today that meets the critically
important, non-negotiable requirements of robustness and low overhead execution for
deployment use. As a result, binary rewriters are generally not used in deployment
today on third-party programs, since for those programs, usually no guarantees can
be made on how they were compiled.
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Dynamic rewriters, such as DynamoRIO[42], copy all the code that executes
into another memory region called a code cache. The code cache is useful because it
ensures robustness; the program still works If a piece of data is mistakenly assumed
to be code and rewritten. The reason is that the code cache was changed and the
original copy of the code segment is still unchanged.
The overhead of dynamic rewriters is caused by two factors. First, copying the
code into the code cache is expensive at run-time. Second, and more seriously, the
target addresses of an indirect Control Transfer Instruction (CTI) must be translated
at run-time because the locations of code have changed to be in the code cache
instead. Such indirect jumps or calls are actually very common – they mostly arise
from return instructions, function pointer calls, and calls to virtual functions in
object-oriented languages, such as C++. This translation process is inevitable for
DynamoRIO since the original destination address in the program is different from
the address of the rewritten code inside the code cache.
1.3 Robust, Low-Overhead Binary Instrumentation
Consequent to the needs above, we developed RL-Bin, our novel dynamic
binary rewriter that ensures both robust behavior and low-overhead execution. RL-
Bin provides guarantees that all benign programs execute correctly and that all the
code in the program is rewritten. First, it ensures low-overhead execution because
it rewrites code in-place in memory, thus avoiding a code cache and its overhead of
address translation and copying of code. Second, it is robust, because it monitors
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every control transfer, so no portion of the binary is rewritten until we know it
is code because we execute a control transfer to it at run time. The overhead of
monitoring every control transfer is reduced in two ways: (a) the monitoring code
removes itself after the potential code it monitors is proven to be code the first
time it is executed; and (b) our design optimizes away some monitoring code using
dynamic JIT-based optimizations that do not rely on unsafe assumptions on static
code.
Figure 1.2 shows the criteria for developing a binary rewriter. As illustrated
existing dynamic rewriters are robust but have high overhead and existing static
rewriters have low overhead but are not robust. RL-Bin is both robust and has low




















Figure 1.2: Criteria for Building a Binary Rewriter
RL-Bin supports several types of obfuscation, in addition to dynamically gen-
9
erated and self-modifying code. As a result, it is robust enough to be used for
benign third-party applications. Also, we have designed and implemented several
optimizations, so it has very low overhead. Throughout this thesis we present the
following contributions.
 Chapter 3
– Design and development of the first low overhead dynamic binary rewriter
that can handle stripped binaries without relocation or debug informa-
tion, containing self-modifying or dynamically-generated code or obfus-
cation.
– An innovative method that tracks the execution of code dynamically by
anticipating future control flow to the new code, and adding instrumen-
tation and breakpoints to process such new code when discovered.
– Using a novel dynamic method to eliminate the overhead of breakpoints,
once the new code is discovered.
– The above design is unlike other dynamic rewriters that translate indirect
control transfer addresses to their copies in a code cache.
– The result is the first In-Place dynamic binary rewriter – which does
not use a code cache – that combines the robustness and coverage of a
dynamic rewriter with the low overhead of a static rewriter.
 Chapter 4
– Using Just-In-Time (JIT) dynamic analysis of the discovered code and
10
traditional data flow analysis concepts, to find ”Safe” functions and fur-
ther reduce the overhead by eliminating redundant checks.
– In-depth analysis and exploration of trade-offs for several optimization
methods to change the impact on memory consumption, including fine-
tuning the parameters to get the best result.
 Chapter 5
– An extensive study of problematic features in obfuscated binaries and the
issues caused for binary rewriting tools.
 Chapter 6
– Development of several innovative methods to enhance RL-Bin, empow-
ering it to handle all kinds of benign binaries, including the ones that are
heavily obfuscated.
– Design and implementation of methods for dynamically deobfuscating
binaries while they are being executed.
– Design of a hybrid code-cache and in-place prototype that adapts itself
based on the characteristics of a binary.
 Chapter 7
– Extensive testing and run-time and memory overhead comparison with
DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst for SPEC CPU2017 benchmark with over
7 million lines of code in C, C++, and Fortran, compiled with Microsoft
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Visual Studio, GCC, and ICC compilers. For obfuscated binary testing,
benchmark applications are obfuscated with three of the most common
obfuscation tools: UPX, PECompact, and ASProtect.
 Chapter 8
– Full design and implementation of an application-level file access permis-
sion system as a use case of RL-Bin. This tool is built on system call
instrumentation capability of RL-Bin and enables the user to define and
enforce separate file access policies for different applications.
– Design and development of a security tool for secure execution of appli-
cations as another use case of RL-Bin. This tool ensures that the original
control flow and calling convention regarding the return instructions is
properly enforced.
1.4 RL-Bin Advantages
RL-Bin will have the following advantages over existing binary rewriters:
 Does not require relocation information. Existing binary rewriters require
relocation information, but as explained, most commercial binaries lack this
information. As a result, only the original developers can rewrite those pro-
grams since only they have access to the object files, which need to be re-linked
to produce binaries with relocation information. In contrast, RL-Bin can be
applied by anyone to any binary executable.
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 Can be applied to legacy applications. Existing binary rewriters cannot rewrite
legacy binaries since virtually all binaries lack relocation information. More-
over, recompilation from source is often not possible since source code is often
not readily available for legacy code. Our rewriter will rewrite legacy binaries
without relocation information and source code.
 Can rewrite 100% of the binary code. Existing rewriters, even with relocation
information, cannot rewrite 100% of a binary’s code since they can only rewrite
what they can prove is code. The difficulty is that data may be buried in the
code section, which will break the program if rewritten. Hence rewriters must
be conservative if they cannot prove that a portion of the binary is code and
not rewrite it.
 Can be used to enforce security on untrusted code. Since existing static binary
rewriters can only be used with developer cooperation, it is not feasible to
enforce security properties on code from untrusted developers. This is because
an untrusted developer may not provide relocation information, leaving us
unable to rewrite the binary. However, any end-user can apply binary rewriting
to enforce security on any code by using RL-Bin, including untrusted code. A
malicious developer cannot avoid this. Moreover, since 100% of the binary’s
code can be rewritten, an attacker cannot hide malicious code in binaries by
making it appear like it might be data to avoid rewriting.
 Can rewrite obfuscated binaries. Obfuscation is a technique used to mislead
attempts to reverse-engineer the code, primarily by making it appear that
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code is data, and vice-versa. Obfuscation is commonly used for high-level
representations such as Java bytecode and Microsoft’s MSIL, since they are
close to the source. Recently obfuscation has become more prevalent in binary
code. Existing binary rewriters cannot rewrite obfuscated binaries correctly.
We have devised an innovative method that correctly rewrites the obfuscated
code.
1.5 Outline of Thesis
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces some of the
background knowledge needed for the subsequent chapters and also discusses the
capabilities and limitations of RL-Bin. Chapter 3 outlines the base algorithm of RL-
Bin and demonstrate our dynamic code discovery and execution routines. Chapter
4 describe the optimization methods designed to reduce the overhead of RL-Bin.
We have also explored the trade-offs that exist in some of our optimization method.
RL-Bin can be configured to decrease run-time or memory overhead. In Chapter
5, we have described obfuscation techniques and the issues they create for binary
rewriting. Chapter 6 introduces RL-Bin++ which is an extension of RL-Bin that
can handle obfuscated binary code with comparatively low overhead. Chapter 7
demonstrates the results of our evaluation of RL-Bin and RL-Bin ++ and compare
them to DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst. Chapter 8 looks into some use cases of
RL-Bin including the following; application-level file access permission tool, secure
execution by restricting RETs, collect run-time properties for end-point security
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tool, generating guaranteed trusted disassembly, debugging and patching in deploy-
ment, and just-in-time analysis and optimization tool. In Chapter 9 we demonstrate
the capabilites of RL-Bin’s application programming interface and compare its run-
time overhead to that of DynamoRIO. Chapter 10 describes the related works in




In this chapter, we will go over structure of memory image of a binary ap-
plication and then we review existing disassembly methods, since disassembly is an
important step in binary rewriters. Then we introduce the basic concepts about
some troublesome features that may be present in benign programs, since those will
need to be handled by any robust binary rewriter. Finally, in the last section we
briefly go over binaries with features for which RL-Bin might fail to instrument
properly, hence we have introduced RL-Bin++ in Chapter 6.
2.1 Memory Image of a Binary Application
The memory image of a binary application consists of code segment, data
segment, and some other memory areas that will be described in the following
paragraphs.
The code segment, which is also known as a text segment, is where a portion
of an executable file that contains instructions. It usually has read and execute
permissions only when loaded to memory. One of the main challenges in binary
rewriting is that it is possible to have data in the code segment. Every correct binary
rewriter should only modify instructions and not the memory locations that contain
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data. As a result, having data in the code segment means that instrumentation in
an address can only be done after making sure that the memory location contains
only code and no data.
The data segment contains global or static variables which have an initial
value. These include any global variable that is not defined in a function, or static
variables that are defined in a function but with static prefix so they retain their
address across calls. One challenge for binary rewriters is that sometimes programs
unpack the code in the data segment, and start executing code from there. Static
binary rewriters would not be able to see this code, since it is generated only after
the execution of the program begins.
Other memory areas in a running binary’s image include the BSS segment, and
heap and stack areas. The BSS segment is adjacent to the data segment and contains
uninitialized data. This segment contains all variables that are not initialized or
initialized to zero. The heap area contains dynamically allocated memory, and
commonly begins after previous segments and grows to larger addresses. The heap
area is shared between threads, shared libraries, and dynamically loaded modules.
The stack area contains the program stack. The stack pointer keeps track of the top
of the stack. The stack frame is the portion of the stack for a function, and contains
its local variables, temporaries, return address, and outgoing arguments.
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2.2 Existing Disassembly Techniques
Disassembly is a key step in static binary rewriting, so we discuss disassem-
bly techniques, which sheds light on several of the difficulties with static binary
rewriting.
2.2.1 Linear Sweep
Linear Sweep begins disassembly at the entry point into the code section of a
binary. This entry point is provided by common executable file formats such as the
Windows PE format. Each instruction is then decoded in sequence until the end
of the section, or until an error occurs. An advantage of linear sweep disassembly
is that it ensures complete code coverage, making it suitable for human viewing
of disassembly output. Its downside is that it can mistake data for code, such as
after an unconditional jump, leading to incorrect rewriting. Hence linear sweep is
unacceptable by itself for rewriters.
2.2.2 Recursive Traversal
Recursive Traversal only disassembles an instruction when we find a control-
flow path to that instruction. To do so, it starts disassembly at the binary code’s
entry point, but recognizes control transfers such as branches, jumps and calls.
When a control transfer instruction is encountered, recursive traversal continues
disassembling at all possible successor instructions. In the case of an unconditional
jump, disassembly continues at the jump target; for conditional branches, disassem-
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bly continues at the target as well as the fall-through instruction. The benefit of
recursive traversal over linear sweep is that it cannot mistakenly disassemble data
bytes as code; hence its output is always correct. However, because disassembly
stops at indirect control transfers, its code coverage is limited. In that sense, it
sacrifices coverage for guaranteed correctness while rewriting.
2.2.3 Pattern Matching
A variety of techniques employ pattern matching to identify bytes such as the
bounds of jump tables or to identify function prologues. Typically, these techniques
are architecture- and compiler-specific, which is a drawback since binary codes can
be produced by a wide variety of compilers and by hand-writing assembly code.
Further, these techniques cannot guarantee correctness since a series of data bytes
might also coincidentally fit the target pattern; hence we do not use this technique.
2.2.4 Speculative Disassembly
Another method used to increase code coverage is speculative disassembly. It
recognizes portions of the code segment that have not yet been disassembled and
assumes that these gaps in the disassembly are most likely the targets of indirect
control transfers. Disassembly is then restarted at the beginning of these identified
blocks assuming they are code. If disassembly encounters bit patterns that are not
legal instructions, then we know that those blocks must have been data and must
not be rewritten. However, unfortunately, the opposite is not true: a block that is
19
actually data may coincidentally also look like legal instructions. Rewriting those
would break the code. Hence speculative disassembly is normally unacceptable for
rewriting since it could lead to incorrect code. Consequently, existing rewriters do
not use speculative techniques, but pay the price in less than 100% code coverage.
2.3 Troublesome Features in Benign Programs
We list some troublesome features that may occur in benign programs. These
must be handled correctly since our goal is robust binary rewriting. Existing static
rewriters have low overhead, but do not handle any of these features in general.
2.3.1 Obfuscation
Obfuscation is a technique used to mislead attempts to reverse-engineer the
code. Here we are primarily concerned about control-flow obfuscation, which makes
it appear that data is code, or vice-versa. (We are not concerned with symbol
obfuscation which makes the program harder to read by a human by changing
symbol names. Symbol obfuscation does not affect most binaries, since stripped
binaries lack symbol names anyway.) However, control-flow obfuscation is relevant
for binaries. There are publicly available applications and research methods which
will control-flow-obfuscate a binary application to further protect the binary from
reverse engineering, such as the binary obfuscation project tool [43], the Arxan tool
[44], and the work by Popov et. al [45].
There are two types of obfuscation techniques that are problematic for binary
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rewriters, and hence are discussed here: (i) Unconditional to conditional branch
flow obfuscation, and (ii) Exception-based obfuscation. Both rely on tricking a
disassembly routines like recursive traversal to make data appear to be code. Relying
on this for rewriting could break the program.
In the unconditional to conditional branch flow obfuscation, an unconditional
branch is replaced by a conditional branch, whose one target is never taken. Instead
the never-taken path contains data. When recursive traversal is used in a rewriter
with this obfuscation, it will falsely assume both targets are code and both will
be disassembled and instrumented. This will modify data incorrectly as code, thus
breaking the program.
Another technique is exception-based obfuscation. In this technique, a change
of control flow is achieved without a control-transfer instruction (CTI), using ex-
ceptions instead. For example, the program may contain a DIVIDE instruction in
which the programmer (or obfuscation tool) deliberately triggers an exception by
using a zero value in the denominator. The program also registers a custom ex-
ception handler for divide-by-zero exceptions, whose code can jump to any target
instruction in the program. In this way, a DIVIDE instruction can act as a jump
that disassembly cannot track. A binary rewriter relying on such disassembly may
miss the target code, thus hurting coverage; and may incorrectly assume the bytes
after the DIVIDE are code, when they could be data, thus breaking correctness.
There are several other exception types that can be used.
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2.3.2 Dynamically Generated Code
Dynamically generated code is actually common in benign applications. It is
mostly used when executing user scripts or any script coming from external sources.
Another reason for having dynamically generated code is packed code, used in a few
benign programs for obfuscation. In this approach, the data in the code segment
is unpacked during the execution of the program and then control is transferred to
this newly generated code using some sort of CTI. This obfuscates code to look like
data, so that human reverse engineers or static disassemblers miss that part of code.
Unlike dynamic rewriters, static rewriters cannot disassemble such dynami-
cally generated code. Our binary rewriter ensures that the newly generated code is
fully disassembled and instrumented, without incurring high overhead.
2.3.3 Self-Modifying Code
Self-modifying code is similar to dynamically generated code with an impor-
tant difference: the addresses into which dynamically generated code are stored
may already contain instructions that have been executed during the program. This
modifies the program’s code at run time.
Self-modifying code could cause serious problems for all types of binary rewrit-
ers, since it means that all the assumptions about the instructions in those memory
addresses are no longer valid after self-modification. For example, a problem could
be that all the instrumentations that were in those memory addresses, are now lost
because they are rewritten by the newly generated code. In the later chaoters, we
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will describe our proposed mechanism for RL-Bin to handle these cases.
2.4 Limitations of RL-Bin and Introduction of RL-Bin++
RL-Bin is capable of analyzing and instrumenting most of the common com-
mercial binary files which do not have relocation information, and may have ob-
fuscated, dynamically-generated or self-modifying code. However, RL-Bin is not
designed to support adversarial binaries, which can deliberately use methods to
prevent their examination by a binary rewriter or a debugger.
Here are certain types of behavior in adversarial binaries that can cause prob-
lems for the binary rewriter.
2.4.1 Verifying the Memory Image Checksum.
Some adversarial binaries compare the checksum on their memory image against
a previously calculated checksum to make sure that the program is not altered by
debuggers. The goal is not ensuring integrity, but defeating debuggers. In most
commercial binaries, developers know that many users may use debuggers on the
software which will not work with such binaries.
2.4.2 Disabling the Debugger.
Binaries can check the presence of a debugger, and if found, can try to disable
it. As mentioned before, commercial binary applications support debuggers.
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2.4.3 Debugger Breakpoints Modification.
Adversarial binaries attempt to remove breakpoints inserted by debuggers,
which can interfere with the operation of rewriters and debuggers. This behavior is
limited to only adversarial binaries.
Due to these limitations, RL-Bin might not properly instrument binaries with
aformentioned features. Hence, we have introduced RL-Bin++ in Chapter 6 which




In this chapter, we describe the base un-optimized algorithm that is used
by RL-Bin. This algorithm has very high overhead (approximately 5x to 10x the
run-time of the un-instrumented program for SPEC CPU2017 benchmarks) but
demonstrates the correctness of the method.
3.1 System Design Overview
The components of RL-Bin are shown in Figure 3.1. The Control Unit keeps
the state of the application and manages other units. The Instrumentation Unit
creates and manages instrumentation routines. The Trampoline Unit is responsible
for efficiently placing trampolines in the original code to redirect execution to the
instrumentation routines. Finally, the analyzer and optimizer unit is responsible for
optimizing and removing instrumentation routines that are no longer needed.
3.2 RL-Bin Baseline Algorithm
Figure 3.2 shows intuitively how RL-Bin discovers and executes code. The
main intuition behind RL-Bin is to add instrumentation at run-time that monitors


















Figure 3.1: RL-Bin System Overview
memory is code only if we discover an actual control transfer to it during run-time.
Our purely dynamic disassembly method will begin at the start of a memory
block (whose address we call START) once it is proven to be code and follows non-
control-transfer instructions one after another, which are all discovered to be code,
until it reaches a control transfer instruction. Whenever the method reaches a CTI,
if that CTI can have more than one possible target, the method ensures that some
instrumentation is triggered when the actual target becomes known later during the
same run.
Some terminology: All instructions that change the control-flow behavior of a
program, such as branches, jumps, and calls, are called Control-Transfer Instructions
(CTIs). A direct CTI is a CTI whose target is specified by an immediate constant
in the instruction. Direct CTIs can be unconditional or conditional. An indirect
CTI is a CTI whose target is specified in a register or memory location and hence






















Figure 3.2: RL-Bin’s Cycle of Code Discovery and Execution
Here are the steps in RL-Bin dynamic Disassembly Routine:
1. Add entry point to the list of instructions to be discovered, let’s name it D.
2. Pick an instruction I from list D.
3. Mark the address of instruction I as discovered in the disassembly table.
4. If instruction I is a non-control-transfer instruction,
(a) The next instruction must be code as well, so we add it to list D if has
not been disassembled before.
5. If instruction I is an unconditional direct CTI,
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(a) It has only one possible constant target (i.e., it is a direct jump), so we
can infer that the target is definitely code as well, so we add the target
to list D and disassembly continues from there.
6. If instruction I is a conditional direct branch, (see Figure 3.3 as an example)
(a) We cannot assume that its target (T) and fall-through (F) addresses are
both code. As discussed before in section 2.3, because of conditional
branch obfuscation, only one of the target or the fall through may be
code, but not necessarily both. Hence we insert hardware breakpoints at
both the target and fall-through addresses (T and F).
(b) Register a custom exception handler for handling these hardware break-
points. Particularly, when either one of them is executed (say T),
i. It will register that memory location as code in the disassembly table.
ii. Then it removes hardware breakpoints at both T and F. (The rea-
son that hardware breakpoints are removed from a block after it is
executed is that in most ISAs, only a small number of hardware
breakpoints is allowed at a time. In the case of x86, there is a limit
of four hardware breakpoints that can be set at a time.)
iii. Adds trampoline at START (see trampoline (1) in Figure 3.3), which
will transfer to instrumentation routine that adds back the hardware
breakpoint at the non-executed address among T and F (say F) (If
the code is executed from START again, we do not need to disas-
semble the code from START again, but just insert the hardware
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breakpoint at F when at START.)
Note: In the case of x86, if there are more than four non-executed
addresses in the function, extra trampoline(s) will be placed in the
middle of function to remove hardware breakpoints from previous
addresses and insert them on the following addresses.
(c) Later, as an optimization, if the handler at F also executes, remove the
hardware breakpoint, as well as the instrumentation at START. This
leads to zero overhead in the steady state after T and F are both proven
to be code.
7. If instruction I is an indirect CTI,
(a) Insert trampolines to an instrumentation routine (see trampoline (2) in
Figure 3.3), just before the indirect CTI to the instrumentation routine
which,
i. Computes the target upon reaching that point.
ii. Add it to the list D, if it is not disassembled before.
(The target of indirect CTIs need to be checked every time because it
can change every time the instruction is executed; hence, our trampoline
and instrumentation will remain in place to check the target of indirect
CTIs to discover new code and handle unexpected control flows.)
8. If D is empty, then exit, otherwise go to step 2.




















Figure 3.3: Disassembling a Memory Block
case, since it tracks the CTI into the dynamically-generated code just like any other
CTI. It also handles unconditional to conditional branch obfuscation as described
above. However, the method needs additional components to handle self-modifying
code and exception-based obfuscation. These will be described in subsections below.
3.3 Handling Self-Modifying Code
Self-modifying code is handled as follows.
1. To check whether the code has modified itself, write-protect the pages that
contain code, so any write to these pages will cause an exception.
2. Register the exception handler to:
(a) Check the addresses which are being written.
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(b) If they have previously been discovered as code, remove those entries
from the disassembly table. (As a result, the newly written code will be
treated the same as the code which has never been seen before.)
The above method is very high overhead and it needs to be optimized. The
main overhead comes from the fact that every write to the code segment will cause
an exception. Such writes will happen if data is stored in the code segment and is
written to by the program. To reduce the overhead, we use the following scheme.
We add instrumentation code around memory store instructions that trigger the
exception for the first time. The instrumentation will turn off write protection,
check the addresses being written to, and turn back on write protection after the
memory store. In this way, stores to data locations in the code segment will never
trigger an exception more than once. As a result, only a small portion of memory
store instructions (those that write to the code segment) will be surrounded by our
added instrumentation.
3.4 Handling Exception-Based Obfuscation
This obfuscation happens when an instruction that is not a CTI is used to
transfer control of the program. As an example, a divide instruction which deliber-
ately triggers an exception can be used as a CTI. As a result, the memory location
following the divide instruction may never be executed. Actually, it may contain
data and not code. To handle exception-based obfuscation, we follow the following
method.
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1. Create a stub for every exception handler that is registered. When an in-
struction triggers the exception it will execute our instrumentation before the
actual exception handler.
2. Disassembly routine must stop disassembly at every instruction that can cause
an exception that has been registered so far. (In the common case no such
exceptions will be registered, thus the overhead will be minimal.)
(a) If such an exception causing instruction is found (in step 4 of the baseline
algorithm), put a hardware break-point on the instruction that immedi-
ately follows it.
(b) After hitting the breakpoint, remove it and start discovering code from
that location. (This method ensures that no data is mistakenly assumed
to be code.)
Using the algorithm in this section, more and more code is discovered during
run-time. This method will ensure that not a single instruction can be executed
without first being observed by our binary rewriter, even if the instruction has been
generated dynamically or through self-modification. Also, in case there is obfusca-
tion, we would never instrument data inside the code segment since we instrument
only the locations that contain code that has been executed during run-time.
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3.5 Handling Multi-Threaded Applications
By the advent of multi-core processors, multi-threaded applications have be-
come very common. As a result, every binary rewriter must handle such applica-
tions. The main issue in multi-threading is to make sure that the data structures
that are shared between threads are being used correctly. Specifically, they should
not be used by a thread while simultaneously being updated by another thread.
To avoid the problems regarding concurrent access to RL-Bin data structures, each
thread must acquire the lock before being able to modify RL-Bin internal data struc-
tures. During this modification, no other threads are allowed to access the same
data structure.
3.6 Disassembly Table Structure
Here we describe the disassembly table, which is the main data structure used
in the algorithm. The table keeps essential information about each byte of the code
segment in the main memory. Each entry of the disassembly table is used to track
the status of the corresponding memory location, and when a new action needs to
be taken.
For each byte in the code segment, there is a two-bit entry in the table which
can show one of four different possibilities (0 to 3) as the status code for that
location. If there is no information about the byte, whether it’s code or data, then
the entry is set to 0. If the byte is code and also it is the start of a basic block, the
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entry is 1. If the byte is code and but not the start of a basic block, the entry is
2. If the byte has been modified by the rewriter to add instrumentation, the entry
is 3. Figure 3.4 shows an example of a disassembly table. In the figure, the status
codes for 0, 1, 2, 3 are encoded in binary in the expected way as 00, 01, 10 and 11,
respectively.
3.7 Instrumentation and Trampolines
Since RL-Bin is an in-place binary rewriter, a trampoline is used to insert any














Figure 3.4: The Disassembly Table
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which rewrites an original known instruction in the code segment, and replaces it by
a CTI that will redirect control to the instrumentation of our choice that needs to be
executed at that point. The instrumentation itself is added elsewhere in the binary,
typically at its end. The instrumentation includes at its beginning the instruction
that was overwritten, followed by the new code of our choice to be inserted, then
followed by a CTI at its end that redirects control back to the original code at the
instruction following the overwritten instruction. Trampolining is a well-known way
of inserting code in binary rewriters.
There are several options for choosing the instruction used as the trampoline.
Each of these options could be used depending on the instruction inside the basic
block that needs to be instrumented.
In the best case, a five-byte long jump can be used to divert the execution to
the instrumentation. This is the preferred method since it is very low overhead and
also it would allow the instrumentation to be in any location in the main memory.
The only downside is to find one or more instructions with total length of five bytes
to be replaced by the trampoline.
Another choice is to use a two- or three-byte short jump. The advantage is
that finding the instruction to be replaced is easier; however, since it is a short jump,
there is not much flexibility regarding the location of instrumentation. This issue
could be resolved in two steps: first by jumping to a five byte long jump, and from
there trampolining to the actual instrumentation which could be placed anywhere
in the memory.
The least efficient way is using the one-byte trap. Since, it takes only one byte,
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it could be inserted anywhere that is needed. This trampoline is used as the last
option, if the methods described above cannot be used. The reason is that a trap
instruction takes hundreds of cycles to be executed and using it frequently would
lead to a very high overhead. Trampolining itself is well understood and common,
so many of the policies for optimizing trampolines are not new, and have been quite
successful in the past.
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Chapter 4: Optimizations
This chapter presents the optimization techniques used in RL-Bin to reduce
the overhead. The effectiveness of each optimization will be discussed in Section
7.3.
4.1 OP1. Conditional Branches
As was described in step 6.3 of the baseline algorithm, if at any point both
outcomes of a conditional branch are registered as code, then the instrumentation
and hardware breakpoints at that branch can both be removed. In the steady state,
the checks before most direct conditional branches are removed.
4.2 OP2. Predicting the Target of Indirect CTIs
The baseline algorithm in step 7, instruments every indirect CTI to compute
its target at run-time and register it as code if it is the first time that the address
is executed as code. This overhead can be reduced by an optimization with the
following intuition: indirect CTIs usually transfer the control to one of a few constant
targets. We will put a check which takes less time before this heavy check of an
indirect CTI.
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As an example, let’s assume that function foo() is being called from three
different call sites. So, the return instruction of the function will return to the
instruction after one of these call sites. First, the target will be checked against
the most frequent call site. If it matched, the indirect CTI can safely transfer the
control flow back to the call site. The same idea would be done for second and third
call sites. In the end, if none of the previous checks were true, we would refer to the
disassembly table to check whether the target of indirect CTI has been discovered
as code before.
4.2.1 Discussion on the trade-offs between different methods of pre-
diction
We will discuss two different methods that we tested for the prediction of
indirect CTIs. The first method is to use profiling to find out the most frequent
destinations of an indirect CTI. Based on the profiling information, we decide the
number of predictions for each branch. The other method uses a fixed number of
predictions and does not rely on profiling information. In this method, we dynam-
ically change the prediction if it was not correct. We discuss the two methods in
detail.
In the first method, the number of predictions will be determined based on
the frequency of the times that a particular destination is taken. The heavy check
(compute the address and check if it has been discovered before) in our implemen-
tation costs around 40 cycles. The light check that compares the target against a
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constant value costs 11 cycles in our implementation. If a light check is not taken,
we continue with the rest of the predictions, and if all of them are incorrect, we fall
back to the heavy check. Formula 1 shows the total cost of the mentioned checks.
Here H is the cost of the heavy check, and L is the cost of light checks. Also, f1 to fn
are the frequency of the destinations based on profiling information. N is the num-
ber of destinations for the indirect CTI. Also, i is the counter to help demonstrating
the cost of the check for the i-th destination.
(1) Total Cost of Checks for an Indirect CTI =
N∑
i=1




In order to find out the optimal number of light checks for each indirect CTI,
we include the first K frequent destinations out of N total destinations. As an
example, consider an indirect branch with the frequency of target addresses 0.8, 0.1,
0.02, 0.01, etc. For one light prediction, K=1, the total cost is (0.8*11+0.2*51 =
19). The cost is (0.8*11+0.1*22+0.1*62=17.2) for the prediction of two targets,
K=2. For three targets, K=3, the cost would be (0.8*11+0.1*22+0.02*33+0.08*73
= 17.5), which means that having two predictions (K=2) is the optimal case.
In general, to calculate the total cost of checks for K predictions, we replace
K for N in the formula above. We continue increasing the number of predictions,
K, until total cost reaches a minimum value, after which increasing K increases the
total cost.
Another method of prediction uses a purely dynamic method based on the
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intuition that a branch is likely to take a target if it has been taken recently. We have
implemented and tested two versions of this method, with one or two predictions.
In the first version, we predict only one target and use light check only for that
prediction. Our prediction is the last destination that is taken by the indirect CTI.
If the predicted address is wrong, we change the prediction and replace it with the
newly taken destination. In the second version, two addresses are predicted. If we
have a misprediction, we replace the first prediction with the second prediction, and
the second prediction will be replaced by the last destination that is taken by the
indirect CTI. This method has more memory overhead, but its run-time overhead












































































































Figure 4.1: Run-time and Memory Overhead of Applications with Three Methods
of Prediction
Figure 4.1 shows the memory and Run-time overhead of SPECrate 2017 bench-
mark applications with three prediction methods: (1) profiling; (2) dynamic with
one prediction; and (3) dynamic with two predictions. The numbers shown in this
figure assume that all other optimization methods of RL-Bin have been applied. As
can be seen, the run-time overhead of the dynamic method with two predictions is
comparable with the profiling method, but its memory overhead is significantly less.
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The dynamic method with one prediction has the lowest memory overhead, which
comes at the expense of higher run-time overhead. Depending on the use case, one
of these methods can be used. The dynamic method with two predictions seems
to fit most of the cases because of the balance between its memory and run-time
overhead and the fact that it does not rely on profiling.
4.3 OP3. Function Cloning
It is often the case in programs that a small function is directly called fre-
quently from a call site. The intuition is to remove the check needed before the
return instruction (indirect CTI) to the call site. During the step 7 of the baseline
algorithm, we selectively clone functions to reduce the overhead and remove the
checks needed before their return instructions.
In this method, the function is cloned so that no check is needed if called
from that specific call site. First, the function is copied to a new location. The call
instruction is modified to a direct jump to the new location. As a result, no return
address will be pushed on the stack. Also, the return instructions in the function
are replaced by direct jumps to the instruction after the call site.
4.3.1 Discussion on when to perform function cloning
Function cloning has the advantage of removing indirect control flow instruc-
tions and the checks needed. However, the downside is that the cloning process
itself is not free and has high overhead in terms of run-time and memory. Thus, we
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need to decide when it is appropriate to clone a function for a particular call-site.
First, we will solely focus on run-time overhead. The ongoing cost is to execute
the return instruction and its instrumentation. If we decide to perform function
cloning for a call site, we pay a higher one-time cost of cloning, but we would no
longer have the ongoing cost. If we already knew how many times a particular call-
site would call the function throughout the execution, it would be easy to calculate
whether it is cost-effective to perform the cloning.
The uncertainty of the number of execution times of the call instruction is
similar to the snoop caching problem. According to [46], when there is an ongoing
cost and a higher cost to get rid of the ongoing cost, the efficient choice is to pay
the one-time cost after the sum of ongoing costs by that point exceeds the former.
As a result, we should clone the function after it has been executed enough times so
that the cost of return and its instrumentation exceeds the cost of cloning. Hence,
the formula for finding the threshold number is the following, where Cc is the cost
of cloning the function per byte, S is the size of the function in bytes, and Cr is the




Figure 4.2 illustrates the run-time and memory overhead when function cloning
is applied at higher thresholds. The overhead numbers in this figure are measured
after all other optimizations of RL-Bin have been applied. The numbers show that as
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the threshold increases, the run-time overhead increases, but the memory overhead
goes down. If the goal is to achieve the lowest possible run-time overhead, cloning
should be done at the threshold T. Otherwise, one can increase the threshold to
have a smaller memory footprint. By default RL-Bin is configured to apply function
cloning at the threshold T. If the goal is smaller memory overhead, then the threshold
10T seems to be a good choice, because it has only 31% memory overhead and its


























































































































Figure 4.2: The Trade-off Between Memory and Run-time Overheads With Different
Thresholds
4.4 OP4. Optimizing Whitelisted Modules
It often happens that applications load dynamically shared libraries during
their execution and then execute functions from them. In most cases, these DLLs
are part of the kernel or they are part of the standard library provided by the
programming language. It is possible to optimize away the checks needed for some
of these DLLs.
The interaction between the main module of the program and the shared
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libraries happens by calling a function exported by the library. The control will be
sent back to the main module after the execution of the function. The only exception
is when the library performs a callback and calls a function from the main module.
DLLs are analyzed and their callback functions are discovered. If the behavior of
the functions and the callback values can be determined prior to execution, then
the analyzed DLL will be whitelisted and checks in that module will be optimized
away.
Set I = Instructions in the function
Set C = Set of Safety Conditions(Called Functions)
1 bool Is_Safe(Address Entry_Point)
2   Set W={Entry_Point} //Insts waiting to be checked
3   While(𝑊 ≠ ∅)
4     pick inst from W
5     if(inst ∈ 𝑃) return false
6     if(inst ∈ Call_Instructions) 
7       add Dests(inst) to C
8       add Next(inst) to W if(Next(inst) ∉ 𝐼)
9     else add Dests(inst) to W if(Dests(inst) ∉ 𝐼)
10     if(stack_height ≠ value assigned before)
11       return false
12 else 
13 assign stack_height of Dests(inst)
14     if (inst is an indirect write)
15       if(Write_Address(inst) = Return_Address) 
16         return false
17     remove inst from W and add it to I
18   Let c ∈ 𝐶 , if(Is_Safe(c) = false) return false
19   return true
P1 = Set of indirect branch instructions
jmp dword ptr [eax*4 + 0x0c]
P2 = Set of instructions that modify the 
stack pointer to a value that is statically 
unknown.
add esp, eax
mov esp, dword ptr [ecx]
Not including  
add esp, 0x4 
(Added value is constant)
P3 = Set of instructions that write to an 
indirect address which may or may not 
be the return address of the function
i.e. mov dword ptr [eax], 0x3c
mov dword ptr [esp + ebp*4], eax
Not including
mov dword ptr [esp + 0x4], eax





Figure 4.3: The Algorithm to Determine Safety of a Given Function. (None of the
instructions in set P, defined on the right side, are allowed in a ”Safe” function.
Dests(inst) return the targets of CTIs and for non-CTIs, returns the next instruc-
tion.)
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4.5 OP5. Detecting ”Safe” Functions
The most common indirect CTIs are return instructions. The overhead of
the checks before return instructions, checks added during step 7 of the baseline
algorithm, can be further eliminated when the function has certain properties. A
”Safe” function, can be proven that it cannot modify its own return address, hence
the return instruction always returns to the instruction after the call site.
We outline in Figure 4.3, our Just-In-Time (JIT) analysis algorithms, by which
the safety of many functions can be established before their execution. For such safe
functions, the instrumentation before the return instruction can be removed. The
intuition behind the algorithm is to determine the exact addresses of the memory
locations on the stack that will be modified by the instructions within the function.
If the return address is not modified, then the function will return to the original
call site.
”Stack Height” for every instruction, is defined to be the difference between
the value of the stack pointer at the entry point of the function and the value of stack
pointer at that instruction. For example, a push instruction will reduce the ”Stack
Height” by four. If the function does not contain any of the instructions defined in
Figure 4.3 as set P, the ”Stack Height” of all instructions can be determined prior
to the execution of the function. If there is more than one control flow paths from
the entry point to a given address, and ”Stack Height” is not the same between
different paths, we declare that function as not ”Safe” and do not optimize it. This
rarely happens in benign code.
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The algorithm will determine the ”Stack Height” of each instruction and based
on the ”Stack Height”, will determine whether an indirect write rewrites the return
address of the function. We also create a list of functions that are called from
this function and put them in set C. Later on, after disassembling all instructions
in the function, we check the safety of all the functions in set C. If any of the
called functions is not safe, the current function will be declared not ”Safe”. If all
the aforementioned checks showed that the return address cannot be modified, the
function will be declared ”Safe”. Note that the algorithm above will be executed
only once for each discovered function, thus there will be no overhead in the steady
state.
4.6 OP6. Using Data-Flow Analysis to Find ”Safe” Functions
OP5 algorithm does not cover some functions, because writing to global or
static data, which is not stored on the stack, is frequently done through indirect
addressing.
If there is a write to an indirect address, we need to make sure it does not
overwrite the return address of the function. Most of the indirect writes to the stack
are done using stack-derived registers as base registers (In x86, these are esp and
ebp registers). So, if the base register is not a stack-derived register or it’s not a
copy of these registers, then it cannot modify any value which is previously stored
on the stack. As a result, we must ensure the base register is not derived from the
stack pointer.
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We define the term PNSD, which is short for ”Provably Not Stack Derived”.
If a register value is PNSD, it means that it can be proved during run-time analysis
that the current value in the register is not derived from the stack pointer. An
indirect write instruction which uses a PNSD register can never write to the stack.
We use traditional data-flow analysis to identify all the different definitions that can
reach the base register in the write instruction. If all of the definitions of the base
register are PNSD, then the base register is also PNSD.
As it is demonstrated in Figure 4.4, we modify the algorithm in the previous
section to check for PNSD variables when there is an instruction, which stores the
value to an indirect address. Again, note that the analysis above will be done only
once for each discovered function, thus there will be no overhead in the steady state.
5  if(inst ∈ 𝑃) return false
5’ if(inst ∈ 𝑃3) 
5”   if(!Is_PNSD(base register))
5”’ return false
P3 = Set of instructions that write to an 
indirect address which may or may not be the 
return address of the function.
𝑷 = 𝒊=𝟏ڂ
𝟐 𝑷𝒊
i.e. mov dword ptr [eax + 0x38], 0x3c
Is_PNSD(eax) returns true if register eax is PNSD
Figure 4.4: Algorithm Modification to Cover Indirect Writes with PNSD Base Reg-
ister.
4.6.1 Discussion on when to apply OP5 and OP6
Optimization methods 5 and 6 provide the advantage of removing the check
before return instruction of safe functions. However, doing just-in-time analysis
when the code is discovered is very costly. The optimization will only be beneficial
if the cost of the analysis to determine the safety is amortized by the elimination of
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instrumentation in multiple executions of that function.
Similar to the discussion above made for function cloning in subsection 4.3,
according to [46] it would only be beneficial to apply the analysis when the function
has been executed enough times that the overhead is more than the cost of analysis.
Based on the following formula, we determine the threshold at which we would apply
the analysis for optimizations 5 and 6, where C5 and C6 are the constants related
to average cost of these optimizations per byte, and S is the size of the function









Figure 4.5 demonstrates the percentage of functions in the SPECrate 2017
benchmark, the safety of which can be determined by optimizations 5 and 6. We
have also shown the percentage of amortizable safe functions, the subset of Safe
functions for which it is worth it to analyze them to find if they are safe. For
amortizable safe functions, the benefit in run-time overhead is more than the time
of analysis. The analysis is done only once per function but every time the function
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is executed we get the benefit of not instrumenting it. As it can be seen in this
figure, to get the lowest run-time overhead, optimizations OP5 and OP6 should










































All Safe Functions Found by OP5
Safe Functions Amortizable for OP5
All Safe Functions Found by OP5+OP6
Safe Functions Amortizable for OP5+OP6
Figure 4.5: Percentage of all Safe Functions and Amortizable Safe Functions For
OP5 and OP6
Similar to the discussion in function cloning in subsection 4.3, we can apply
OP5 and OP6 optimizations at a higher threshold. That means that the function
must be executed several times more than the analysis time. Unlike function cloning,
this does not lead to a trade-off between memory and run-time overheads. Applying
OP5 and OP6 at a higher threshold would lead to both higher run-time and memory
overhead.
We also considered applying OP5 and OP6 at a lower threshold, meaning that
OP5 and OP6 are applied to functions that are not executed enough times that would
amortize the function analysis time. This would lead to higher run-time overhead
but reduces the memory overhead, because proving that a function is safe means
there is no need to instrument the function. Although memory overhead is reduced,
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it is not by a very significant amount. In our experimental results for SPECrate
2017 applications, if we perform OP5 and OP6 analysis for every function (which
are not necessarily amortizable), memory overhead is reduced form 69% to 60% and
run-time overhead increases from 4% to 9%. The memory overhead reduction is not
worth the increase in run-time overhead, hence we apply OP5 and OP6 only when
the threshold is reached for each optimization.
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Chapter 5: Difficulties of Obfuscation for Binary Rewriting
Obfuscation refers to all different techniques used to conceal the structure of
the code. These methods were previously frequently used by malicious software, but
recently, it has become more common in benign applications. The reason is that
commercial applications need to be protected against reverse engineering. In some
cases, obfuscation would help with digital rights management (DRM) and avoid
undesired or illegal software uses.
Obfuscated binaries have complex features that can be categorized into the fol-
lowing groups: Anti-Disassembly, Anti-Debugging, Anti-Rewriting, Dynamic Code,
and Convention Infringement. In general, these features are added to prevent the
software from being reverse engineered or modified. The problematic characteris-
tics of obfuscated binaries intentionally mislead analysis tools such as disassemblers,
debuggers, and rewriters.
5.1 Explanation of Problematic Features
Several features are introduced by obfuscators to throw off analysis tools. This
section categorizes these features based on the similarity and the targeted analysis
tool. Table 5.1 shows the five categories of these challenging features. This section
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Anti-Rewriting Self-Checksum of code
Section Label Misuse
Convention Infringement Function Handling Obstruction
Calling Convention Misuse
Anti-Debugging Debugger Resistant
Table 5.1: Categories of Problematic Features Found in Obfuscated Binaries
5.1.1 Anti-Disassembly
Disassembly tools such as IDA Pro [47] depend on extracting instruction from
the binary file by well-known methods like linear sweep or recursive traversal. Linear
sweep starts at the entry point of the binary and consecutively disassemble instruc-
tions one after another. On the other hand, recursive traversal begins at the entry
point and follows control transfer instructions to disassemble code.
There are three primary methods of throwing off disassemblers. The first
method is creating unnecessary indirection in CTIs, whose target is unknown before
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execution and will be missed by static disassemblers. The second method is creating
ambiguity by converting unconditional branches to conditional branches with two
targets. One of the targets is fake and contains data instead of code. Disassemblers
using the recursive traversal method would mistakenly disassemble invalid instruc-
tions from the fake target address. The third method is changing the control-flow
by deliberately causing exceptions during run-time. Static tools would not realize
that exception would happen during run-time, and therefore they would miss the
program’s original control-flow.
5.1.2 Dynamic Code Modification
Most of the analysis tools are static. Hence, it is enticing for obfuscation tools
to generate and execute code dynamically. This code will remain hidden from all
static tools. We categorize dynamic code modification to dynamically-generated
and self-modifying code. The difference between dynamically-generated and self-
modifying code is that the latter replaces the code that has been executed before.
The most common method used by obfuscators is unpacking encrypted code and
running the decrypted payload.
5.1.3 Anti-Rewriting
Anti-rewriting techniques are used to ensure that the binary is not modified
by rewriting tools. The technique validates that the original code is not altered by
calculating checksum and verifying it against a known value. The checksum might
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be calculated over the static binary file or part of the program’s memory image. It
could be the whole code segment or just the unpacked payload. Another variation
of anti-rewriting methods is to hide code in strange locations such as the Portable
Executable (PE) header file. The goal is to detect if a rewriter has modified or
renamed sections of the binary file. In that case, the hidden code is altered, and the
rewriter will be detected.
5.1.4 Convention Infringement
There exist unwritten rules about binary code that is generated by compilers.
For example, functions are generally a continuous part of code addresses starting at
the entry-point and ending with one or more return instructions. Functions regularly
do not share code blocks and follow a calling convention for using registers, passing,
and cleaning up the arguments. In addition, memory sections are divided into code
and data sections with separate read/write/execute permissions. None of the rules
mentioned above is mandatory, and obfuscation tools do not follow them to evade
the analysis tools that depend on them.
5.1.5 Anti-Debugging
Obfuscation tools attempt to bypass debuggers by detecting them and inter-
fering with breakpoints. Debuggers register themselves in the operating system as
the target process’s debugger to get the first chance to handle the exceptions. In
addition, debuggers use one-byte software breakpoints and single-step traps, and
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hardware breakpoints to monitor the execution of the application. Obfuscation
tools can detect the debugger registration and stop execution if a debugger is found.
Additionally, they can insert or remove breakpoints that are intended to be solely
used by the debugger. By doing that, the debugger would not be able to behave as
expected.
5.2 Effect of Problematic Features on RL-Bin
This section discusses in detail the problematic features in each of the five
obfuscation categories. Primarily, we examine the effect of each feature on RL-Bin.
Some features significantly increase the overhead of RL-Bin, while others would
cause the program to behave unexpectedly under RL-Bin. Table 5.2 demonstrates
the code artifacts corresponding to each feature. In this section, we will study the
effect of these code constructions on RL-Bin.
5.2.1 CTI Target Obfuscation
Unlike conditional and unconditional direct branches, indirect CTIs have an
unknown number of destinations which are not known before run-time. Anti-
disassembly schemes convert direct CTIs to indirect CTIs so that static disassem-
blers cannot follow the program’s control-flow. As discussed in the previous section,
RL-Bin inserts a dynamic check before indirect CTIs. As a result, an increased
number of indirect CTIs would lead to higher overhead when the binary is executed
under RL-Bin.
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Category Problematic Feature Code Artifacts








Dynamic Code Self-Modifying Code Code Rewriting
Overwrite of
Executing Function



















Anti-Debugging Breakpoint Manipulation Reusing HW Or
SW Breakpoints
Table 5.2: Code Artifacts of Problematic Features.
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5.2.2 Ambiguous Code and Data
Another method that is used by anti-disassembly tools is converting uncondi-
tional branches to conditional branches. The main goal of obfuscators is to increase
the control-flow’s complexity so that disassemblers would be less likely to find the
actual execution path. In the case of RL-Bin, it will encounter numerous condi-
tional branches for which one of the targets is never executed as code. That would
force RL-Bin to move and replace hardware breakpoints frequently, clearly leading
to higher overhead.
5.2.3 Self-modifying Code
Dynamic code generation and execution commonly occur when executing inter-
preted languages such as JavaScript. RL-Bin has no problem handling dynamically-
generated code since the code is discovered dynamically. There is no difference
between the dynamically-executed code and static code from the rewriter point of
view. However, self-modifying code requires RL-Bin to invalidate the result of its
analysis for self-modified addresses. Self-modifying is rare in benign commercial
binaries, but obfuscation tools would deliberately transform regular code to self-
modifying code to hinder the performance of binary analysis tools.
5.2.4 Memory Checksumming
This method is used to validate the code’s integrity and ensure that it has
not been modified before execution. The checksum can be either calculated for
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the binary file or its memory image. The binary file checksum would detect the
transformations done by static rewriters. RL-Bin does not modify the binary file
so that the file checksum can be verified. However, RL-Bin inserts instrumentation
in place of the original code, which would change the memory image checksum.
Consequently, the obfuscation tool would detect the presence of RL-Bin, and the
program behavior would change accordingly. Binary rewriters should not cause any
change in the program’s behavior.
5.2.5 Section Protection Violation
Mixing code and data is a popular strategy in binary obfuscation tools. Tra-
ditionally, code and data are stored in separate binary sections with their own
read/write/execute permissions. While the code section is read/execute-only, writable
data and read-only data are stored in separate sections.
Obfuscation tools do not follow these conventions and place writable data in
the code section. Any data write in the code section triggers RL-Bin’s detection
method for self-modifying code. Repeated writes to the code section would signifi-
cantly increase the overhead of RL-Bin.
5.2.6 Function Handling Obstruction
Reverse engineering is heavily dependent on detecting and analyzing functions
within a binary. A function is the smallest piece of code that performs a meaningful
task; therefore, analysis tools employ complex algorithms to detect the functions’
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boundaries and properties.
Because of the importance of functions in program analysis, the obfuscation
tools try to hide the functions’ boundaries. This task is done using an alternative
sequence of instructions that are equivalent to call/return instructions. For exam-
ple, a subsequent push and jump can be used instead of a call. Other function
obfuscation techniques that are deployed include creating non-contiguous functions
or abnormal functions that share basic blocks.
Together these techniques will hinder the ”safe function analysis” used in RL-
Bin, hence leading to fewer safe functions detected. Our analysis shows that the
number of ”safe functions” seen in obfuscated binaries is one-third of the binaries
before obfuscation. As a result, the overhead of obfuscated binaries running under
RL-Bin is unacceptable.
5.2.7 Calling-Convention Exploitation
Compilers generate code that follows appropriate calling conventions. Each
calling convention uses a different standard to handle passing arguments and clean-
ing them up after the call. Still, the common fact is that the flags register’s value
is not passed across different functions. RL-Bin utilizes this fact and modifies the
flags register value in the instrumentation routine for the return instruction. If the




This obfuscation technique uses the software and hardware breakpoints to
redirect the control-flow. The tool registers the appropriate handler and inserts
the breakpoint in the original code. Once the breakpoint is hit, the control-flow
switches to the handler, and the execution continue from there. These breakpoints
are supposed to be used only by debuggers. If an application uses these breakpoints,
the debugger cannot differentiate between the user’s breakpoints and the original
ones. Particularly, RL-Bin uses software (SW) and hardware (HW) breakpoints to
manage the control-flow. If the program manipulates the breakpoints set by RL-Bin,
the rewriter might lose control of the application.
60
Chapter 6: Overcoming Troublesome Features, Introducing RLBin++
6.1 Proposed Methods for Handling Obfuscation
We have designed and implemented novel methods to handle the challenging
features that RL-Bin had not previously handled. As discussed in Chapter 5, RL-Bin
can still instrument the program with an unsatisfactory overhead for some features.
For the rest of the features, RL-Bin might cause the program behavior to change,
which must never happen. Our methods would resolve all the issues that were
discussed in Chapter 5. Table 6.1 demonstrates which code artifacts are handled by
a given method. In this chapter, we will describe each of our proposed methods in
detail, and we would show the effectiveness of these methods in Section 7.5.
6.2 Indirect CTI Deobfuscation
RL-Bin follows the execution of the program dynamically by tracking all
control-flow transfer instructions, specifically indirect CTIs. Obfuscation tools con-
vert direct jumps and calls to indirect CTIs, forcing RL-Bin to insert instrumen-
tation before indirect CTIs, effectively leading to higher overhead. We propose a
deobfuscation method to change these indirect CTIs back to the original direct jump
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# Method Name Handled Code Artifacts
I Indirect CTI Deobfuscation High Percentage of Indirect Calls
High Percentage of Indirect Jumps
II Hybrid Code-Cache - Write Emulation Code Rewriting
Conditional Branch Obfuscation
Writeable Data in Code Segment
III Shadow Memory - Read Emulation Checksum of Code
IV Safe Function Detection Improvement Function Entry Not First Block
Functions Share Blocks of Code
Non-standard Calls/Returns
Overwrite of Executing Function
V Flag Register Liveness Analysis Flags Used Across Functions
VI Breakpoint Protection Reusing HW or SW Breakpoints
Table 6.1: Methods Introduced to Efficiently Handle Code Artifacts.
or call. Based on our observation of obfuscated binaries, we detected three main
patterns to create indirect CTIs. These obfuscation methods are demonstrated in
figure 6.1.
The first method is creating an address table to create indirection. Instead of
directly jumping to a location, the obfuscator changes the instruction to an indirect
jump going to an address stored in the address table. Our method would detect
such indirect CTIs and convert them back to the original direct CTI. Then we make
62
10 
original copy is never executed, and only the copy of the block can be executed from the code-cache. Implementing the 
code-cache would also help with conditional branch obfuscation, which will be discussed later in subsection 6.6. 
Figure 1: Three Patterns of Indirect CTI Obfuscation. 
The disassembly table keeps the information of executed code addresses. If a block of code is copied to the code-
cache, the corresponding value would be CODE_CACHE. Otherwise, it would be ORIG_CODE, which means that it will 
be executed from its original location. To catch the writes to the code pages, we write-protect the code section to causes 
an exception. A handler is registered to catch this exception and replace the write instruction with an emulated-write, 
shown in figure 2. The emulated-write would check the destination address. If it is an original code location, it will write 
the value, and we will move the block to the code-cache. If the block is already in the code-cache, we invalidate the entry 
for that block so that the new rewritten version is copied and executed from the cache. Finally, if the address is not code, 
it must be data, and we will execute the write instruction normally. 
For better performance, we remove write-access-protection before executing an emulated-write so that it does not 
trigger an exception. After the emulated-write, we will enable the write-access-protection. The number of instructions 
that write to code pages is limited; hence, our method's overhead is minimal. The results section will demonstrate our 
method's effectiveness for handling self-modifying code and writing to code pages. 
Original Write Emulated Write 
 mov dword ptr[0x0100], eax 
 
 Disable Write Access Protection 
if(d_table[0x100] == ORIG_CODE) 
    move the block to the code-cache 
else if(d_table[0x100] == CODE_CACHE) 
    invalidate the block 
else mov dword ptr[0x0100], eax 
Enable Write Access Protection 
Figure 2: Converting Write Instruction to Emulated Write Routine. 
6.3 Shadow Memory - Read Emulation 
Obfuscated binaries might attempt to calculate and validate the checksum of code on the memory. RL-Bin sometimes 
replaces the original instructions with instrumentation code, and that would modify the checksum. We propose a 
solution that would emulate the read instructions and deceive them into reading the original value. 
All code pages will be read-protected so that any read from the code section causes an exception. We register a 
handler to catch this exception. Once a read instruction attempts reading from the code section, we replace it with 
emulated read, demonstrated in figure 3.  
Before Obfuscation jmp 0x0100 Obfuscation 1 jmp dword ptr[0x2000] Address Table 
0x2000 : 0x100 
 
 





Obfuscation 3 mov eax,dword ptr[0x2000] 
jmp eax 
Address Table 
0x2000 : 0x100 
Figure 6.1: Three Patterns of Indirect CTI Obfuscation
sure that the address table remains constant by write protecting it. If the address
table values are modified at any later point, we will change the corresponding direct
CTIs. The sec nd m thod of indirect CTI obfuscation is storing a onstant value
in a register and using that register as an operand. The instruction that stores
the constant value might not be immediately before the jump instruction. Our
workaround is to perform Just-In-Time (JIT) data-flow analysis on the basic block
that ends with the indirect CTI. If the register has only one definition reaching the
indirect CTI, we will convert the indirect CTI back to the original direct CTI. The
last type of obfuscation in our study is the combination of previous techniques. Our
solution would be performing the same data-flow analysis on the operand register.
Additionally, we write-protect the address table and update the corresponding CTI
if the table is modified.
6.3 Hybrid Code-Cache - Write Emulation
Comp led binari s rarely write a value on code pages. On the contrary, the
behavior is frequently observed in obfuscated binaries. A write to a code page
might overwrite an instruction, self-modifying code, or write to a data address. We
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propose a combination of code-cache and write emulation to handle both cases of
self-modifying code and frequent writes to the code section. A code-cache is a copy
of code blocks. If a block of code is on the code-cache, the original copy is never
executed, and only the copy of the block can be executed from the code-cache.
Implementing the code-cache would also help with conditional branch obfuscation,
which will be discussed later in Section 6.6.
The disassembly table keeps the information of executed code addresses. If
a block of code is copied to the code-cache, the corresponding value would be
CODE CACHE. Otherwise, it would be ORIG CODE, which means that it will be
executed from its original location. To catch the writes to the code pages, we write-
protect the code section to causes an exception. A handler is registered to catch this
exception and replace the write instruction with an emulated-write, shown in figure
6.2. The emulated-write would check the destination address. If it is an original
code location, it will write the value, and we will move the block to the code-cache.
If the block is already in the code-cache, we invalidate the entry for that block so
that the new rewritten version is copied and executed from the cache. Finally, if
the address is not code, it must be data, and we will execute the write instruction
normally.
For better performance, we remove write-access-protection before executing an
emulated-write so that it does not trigger an exception. After the emulated-write,
we will enable the write-access-protection. The number of instructions that write to
code pages is limited; hence, our method’s overhead is minimal. The results section
will demonstrate our method’s effectiveness for handling self-modifying code and
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original copy is never executed, and only the copy of the block can be executed from the code-cache. Implementing the 
code-cache would also help with conditional branch obfuscation, which will be discussed later in subsection 6.6. 
Figure 1: Three Patterns of Indirect CTI Obfuscation. 
The disassembly table keeps the information of executed code addresses. If a block of code is copied to the code-
cache, the corresponding value would be CODE_CACHE. Otherwise, it would be ORIG_CODE, which means that it will 
be executed from its original location. To catch the writes to the code pages, we write-protect the code section to causes 
an exception. A handler is registered to catch this exception and replace the write instruction with an emulated-write, 
shown in figure 2. The emulated-write would check the destination address. If it is an original code location, it will write 
the value, and we will move the block to the code-cache. If the block is already in the code-cache, we invalidate the entry 
for that block so that the new rewritten version is copied and executed from the cache. Finally, if the address is not code, 
it must be data, and we will execute the write instruction normally. 
For better performance, we remove write-access-protection before executing an emulated-write so that it does not 
trigger an exception. After the emulated-write, we will enable the write-access-protection. The number of instructions 
that write to code pages is limited; hence, our method's overhead is minimal. The results section will demonstrate our 
method's effectiveness for handling self-modifying code and writing to code pages. 
Original Write Emulated Write 
 mov dword ptr[0x0100], eax 
 
 Disable Write Access Protection 
if(d_table[0x100] == ORIG_CODE) 
    move the block to the code-cache 
else if(d_table[0x100] == CODE_CACHE) 
    invalidate the block 
else mov dword ptr[0x0100], eax 
Enable Write Access Protection 
Figure 2: Converting Write Instruction to Emulated Write Routine. 
6.3 Shadow Memory - Read Emulation 
Obfuscated binaries might attempt to calculate and validate the checksum of code on the memory. RL-Bin sometimes 
replaces the original instructions with instrumentation code, and that would modify the checksum. We propose a 
solution that would emulate the read instructions and deceive them into reading the original value. 
All code pages will be read-protected so that any read from the code section causes an exception. We register a 
handler to catch this exception. Once a read instruction attempts reading from the code section, we replace it with 
emulated read, demonstrated in figure 3.  
Before Obfuscation jmp 0x0100 Obfuscation 1 jmp dword ptr[0x2000] Address Table 
0x2000 : 0x100 
 
 





Obfuscation 3 mov eax,dword ptr[0x2000] 
jmp eax 
Address Table 
0x2000 : 0x100 
Figure 6.2: Converting Write Instruction to Emulated Write Routine
writing to code pages.
6.4 Shadow Memory - Read Emulation
Obfuscated binaries might attempt to calculate and validate the checksum
of code on the memory. RL-Bin sometimes replaces the original instructions with
instrumentation code, and that would modify the checksum. We propose a solution
that would emulate the read instructions and deceive them into reading the original
value. All code pages will be read-protected so that any read from the code section
causes an exception. We register a handler to catch this exception. Once a read
instruction attempts reading from the code section, we replace it with emulated
read, demonstrated in figure 6.3.
If an instruction is replaced by instrumentation, the corresponding value in
the disassembly table is REPLACED. We maintain a map, ORIG, to keep the
original bytes that are rewritten. If a read instruction reads from a modified address,
we will feed it the actual value. As an optimization, emulated-read disables read
access protection before reading and enable it after that, so the exception is not
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If an instruction is replaced by instrumentation, the corresponding value in the disassembly table is REPLACED. We 
maintain a map, ORIG, to keep the original bytes that are rewritten. If a read instruction reads from a modified address, 
we will feed it the actual value. As an optimization, emulated-read disables read access protection before reading and 
enable it after that, so the exception is not triggered. Obfuscated binaries typically attempt to calculate this checksum 
only once, so emulated read does not have an adverse effect on the overhead. 
Original Read Emulated Read 
 mov eax, dword ptr [0x0100] 
 
 Disable Read access protection 
if(d_table[0x100] == REPLACED) 
    mov eax, ORIG[0x0100] 
else 
    mov eax, ORIG[0x0100] 
Enable Read access protection 
Figure 3: Converting Read Instruction to Emulated Read Routine. 
6.4 Safe Function Detection Improvement 
Obfuscation tools use multiple techniques and code artifacts that limit RL-Bin's ability to detect functions and their 
safety property. First, non-standard use of calls or returns means fewer functions can be detected.  
Next, shared blocks between functions lead to the safety property not be decided by our current method. Finally, the 
functions that overwrite themselves can mislead our approach to declare a function to be safe mistakenly. Once the 
function is overwritten, it might no longer be safe. We deem a function is no longer safe once an overwrite to the same 
function is detected. 
To handle the first two issues, we modify our algorithm to detect subfunctions. We determine the safety of these 
subfunctions based on how they are connected during run-time. Here are the relaxed criteria for a subfunction. 
 Each subfunction has only one entry-point and one or more exit points. 
 The control-flow can be redirected to the entry-point of subfunctions by any direct or indirect CTI. Also, exit-point 
does not need to be a return instruction and could be any indirect CTI.   
 The stack pointer's value could change between the entry-point and exit-point(s) by a fixed amount. 
These modifications would lead to smaller chunks of code being detected as subfunctions. During run-time, these 
subfunctions will be analyzed. Once the control-flow between subfunctions is determined, we declare a subfunction to 
be safe if the stack's return address is not modified. 
6.5 Flag Register Liveness Analysis 
As discussed in section 5, obfuscation tools might use the flag register's value immediately after returning from a call. It 
would cause a problem for RL-Bin because RL-Bin's instrumentation for the return instruction overwrites the zero bit of 
the flag register. A high-overhead solution would be saving and restoring the flag register before and after the 
instrumentation routine that performs the check. Our proposed optimization is to not save and restore the flags register 
when possible. We would perform dynamic JIT analysis in the target of the return instruction to ensure that the value 
of the flag register is dead, meaning that instruction will overwrite it before being used by any other instruction. If the 
flag register is not live in any of the targets of return, there is no need to save and restore the flags register. 
Figure 6.3: Converting Read Instruction to Emulated Read Routine
triggered. Obfuscated binaries typically attempt to calculate this checksum only
once, so emulated read does not have an adverse effect on the overhead.
6.5 Safe Function Detection Improvement
Obfuscation tools use multiple techniques and code artifacts that limit RL-
Bin’s ability to detect functions and their safety property. First, non-standard
use of calls or returns means fewer functions can be detected. Next, shared blocks
between functions lead to the s fety property ot be d ided by our current method.
Finally, the functions that overwrite themselves can mislead our approach to declare
a function to be safe mistakenly. Once the function is overwritten, it might no
longer be safe. We deem a function is no longer safe once an overwrite to the same
function is detected. To handle the first two issues, we modify our algorithm to
detect subfunctions. We determine the safety of these subfunctions based on how
they are connected during run-time. Here are the relaxed criteria for a subfunction.
 Each subfunction has only one entry-point and one or more exit points.
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 The control-flow can be redirected to the entry-point of subfunctions by any
direct or indirect CTI. Also, exit-point does not need to be a return instruction
and could be any indirect CTI.
 The stack pointer’s value could change between the entry-point and exit-
point(s) by a fixed amount.
These modifications would lead to smaller chunks of code being detected as
subfunctions. During run-time, these subfunctions will be analyzed. Once the
control-flow between subfunctions is determined, we declare a subfunction to be
safe if the stack’s return address is not modified.
6.6 Flag Register Liveness Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 5, obfuscation tools might use the flag register’s value
immediately after returning from a call. It would cause a problem for RL-Bin
because RL-Bin’s instrumentation for the return instruction overwrites the zero bit
of the flag register. A high-overhead solution would be saving and restoring the flag
register before and after the instrumentation routine that performs the check. Our
proposed optimization is to not save and restore the flags register when possible. We
would perform dynamic JIT analysis in the target of the return instruction to ensure
that the value of the flag register is dead, meaning that instruction will overwrite it
before being used by any other instruction. If the flag register is not live in any of
the targets of return, there is no need to save and restore the flags register.
RL-Bin uses hardware and software breakpoints to follow the control-flow of
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the program. The one-byte trap (0xcc in x86 assembly) for instrumentation pur-
poses. RL-Bin inserts a one-byte trap and registers an exception handler for it.
When the exception is triggered, RL-Bin will execute the instrumentation routine.
As discussed in Chapter 3 , hardware breakpoints are used at the fall-through and
target of conditional CTIs and triggered once the path is executed. If the obfus-
cated binary writes to registers which control hardware breakpoints, our proposed
method is to switch to selectively using code-cache. In this case, we give up on us-
ing hardware breakpoints to handle conditional CTIs. The basic block that contains
the conditional CTI will be copied to the code-cache. Unlike the original memory,
we can put instrumentation in the fall-through and target in the code-cache. Once
both paths are taken, we can execute that basic block from the original location. We
modify the algorithm to maintain a map of one-byte traps inserted by RL-Bin++
to handle software breakpoint manipulation. Once the trap is triggered, the address
will be checked against the rewriter map. If the breakpoint is not inserted by the
rewriter, it would not catch the exception and not interfere with the program’s in-
tended control-flow. As a result, RL-Bin++ and the binary both will use the traps
with no conflicts.
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Chapter 7: Evaluation and Results
We have completed and tested a fully optimized prototype of the above method.
Most of the code is written in C++, while there are some functions which are writ-
ten in x86 assembly, for the sake of optimization. Our experiments are done on
a system with Intel Core i7, 3.33GHz CPU with 12 Mb cache and 24.0 Gb DDR3
memory on 64-bit Windows 10 OS. We chose Windows Operating System since most
commercial binaries are developed for Windows.
In our experimental setup, we used SPECrate 2017 Integer and Floating Point
with their reference data sets. SPECrate Integer has 10 benchmarks demonstrated
in table 7.1 and all of them are included in our testing. However, we could evaluate
10 out of 13 benchmarks in SPECrate Floating Point, which are shown in table
7.2. The other three benchmarks could not be compiled for 32-bit x86 Windows
machines, thus fotonik3d r, cactuBSSN r, and cam4 r were excluded from the set.
Also, we compiled the binaries with three different compilers; Microsoft Visual
Studio, GCC, and ICC. The overhead reported for each benchmark is the average
of the overhead for binaries compiled with these compilers. In the case that a
benchmark could not be compiled with a particular compiler, that compiler is not




Language KLOC Application Area
500.perlbench r C 362 Perl Interpreter
502.gcc r C 1304 GNU C Compiler
505.mcf r C 3 Route Planning
520.omnetpp r C++ 134 Discrete Event Simulation
523.xalancbmk r C++ 520 XML to HTML Conversion
525.x264 r C 96 Video Compression
531.deepsjeng r C++ 10 Alpha-beta Tree Search (Chess)
541.leela r C++ 21 Monte Carlo Tree Search (Go)
548.exchange2 r Fortran 1 Sudoku Recursive Solution Generator
557.xz r C 33 General Data Compression
Table 7.1: SPECrate 2017 Integer
Comparison with DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst: According to [48] and [49],
we compared RL-Bin to the most efficient and robust state-of-the-art dynamic
rewriters available. The reason for their robustness is the implementation using
the code-cache. To the best of our knowledge, the three mentioned rewriters are





Language KLOC Application Area
503.bwaves r Fortran 1 Explosion modeling
507.cactuBSSN r C++, C, Fortran 257 Physics: relativity
508.namd r C++ 8 Molecular dynamics
510.parest r C++ 427 Biomedical imaging
511.povray r C++, C 170 Ray tracing
519.lbm r C 1 Fluid dynamics
521.wrf r Fortran, C 991 Weather forecasting
526.blender r C++, C 1577 3D rendering and animation
527.cam4 r Fortran, C 407 Atmosphere modeling
538.imagick r C 259 Image manipulation
544.nab r C 24 Molecular dynamics
549.fotonik3d r Fortran 14 Computational Electromagnetics
554.roms r Fortran 210 Regional ocean modeling
Table 7.2: SPECrate 2017 Floating Point
7.1 Run-time Overhead
The goal of RL-Bin is to perform only light instrumentation in an efficient man-
ner. Although it can be used to perform heavy instrumentation, such as basic block
counting, no binary rewriter can deliver low overhead for such instrumentation, be-
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cause the added instrumentation itself is heavyweight. Hence such instrumentations
are not good use-cases for RL-Bin, whose main motivation is low run-time overhead
in deployed code. As a result, the run-time overhead of applications running under
binary rewriter without instrumentation should be low and has been measured.
7.1.1 Overhead without Instrumentation
As it is illustrated in Figure 7.1, RL-Bin outperforms other rewriters by a
significant margin, allowing it to be a more feasible choice for deployed code. In this
Figure, a run-time of 100 is the run-time of the original unmodified program without
rewriting. (The overhead shown as 107, means the overhead added by the rewriter
is 7% without any instrumentation.) In fact, the overhead of DynamoRIO, Pin, and
Dyninst for the average of SPECrate 2017 Floating Point and Integer benchmarks
respectively is 1.16x, 1.26x, and 1.20 on average, whereas the overhead of RL-Bin
is 1.04x for the same benchmarks (4% on average). The reason for higher overhead








































































































Figure 7.1: Normalized Run-Time and Memory of Rewriters Without Added In-
strumentation for SPECrate 2017.
The memory overhead is also illustrated in figure 7.1. The memory overhead
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of DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst is 2.3x, 2.73x, and 2.5x respectively, while that of
RL-Bin is only 1.69x. The main reason for lower memory overhead is that RL-Bin is












































































































Figure 7.2: Normalized Run-Time and Memory Overhead of Rewriters with Added
Instrumentations to Count External Calls for SPECrate 2017
7.1.2 Overhead with Instrumentation
The next experiment measures the run-time and memory overhead added by
the rewriters when instrumenting the application to count the number of external
calls from the application module to other DLLs. This particular instrumentation
is used because the number of locations that need to be instrumented is relatively
low. Hence, it is a good use-case of RL-Bin to perform light instrumentation with
very low overhead. Figure 7.2 shows the overhead of RL-Bin with an average of
19% compared to DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst which have 28%, 38%, and 33%
average overhead respectively. Our experiment demonstrates that RL-Bin can be
successfully used to add instrumentation with fairly low overhead compared to other
dynamic rewriters.
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7.2 Memory vs Run-time Trade-off and Fine-Tuning Optimization
Methods
In this section, we will demonstrate how RL-Bin could be fine-tuned to de-
crease its memory footprint. Based on the discussions in section 4, we can fine-tune
the function cloning and branch prediction optimizations to reduce memory over-
head of RL-Bin.
Figure 7.3 shows the run-time and memory overheads of SPECrate 2017 bench-
marks with their reference data set and no added instrumentation. This figure shows
the memory and run-time of RL-Bin with different configurations for branch predic-
tion and function cloning. In this figure, Prof means that profiling method is used
for branch prediction, and Dyn1 and Dyn2 mean that dynamic branch prediction
method with one or two predictions is used. By default RL-Bin is configured for
best performance and clones the function at the threshold, T, and uses the dynamic
prediction method with two predictions. The run-time overhead is 4% over the
















































































































Figure 7.3: Normalized Run-Time of Rewriters Without Added Instrumentation for
SPECrate 2017.
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By changing the branch prediction method and function cloning threshold, it
is possible to reduce the memory footprint to only 18%, at the expense of run-time
overhead as high as 15%. In particular, to get satisfying memory and run-time
overhead, RL-Bin can be tuned to clone functions at 10T and use the dynamic
prediction with two predictions method, which would lead to 7% run-time overhead
and 31% memory overhead. The correct configuration can be chosen by the user
(e.g., the system administrator), based on the objectives and constraints of the
system and application.
7.3 Optimization Effectiveness
To show the contribution of each optimization method proposed in section
4, we measured the overhead of SPECrate 2017 Integer and Floating Point with
different optimization levels. Figure 7.4 shows the overhead with six different opti-
mization level. For Specrate 2017 Integer, The overhead is expectedly large (10.25x
for perlbench r) without any optimization. Optimizing conditional branches (OP1)
will bring the average overhead from 7.24x to 2.93x. Adding target prediction for
indirect CTIs will reduce the overhead of remaining checks, thus the average over-
head will be 2.02x with OP1+OP2. Whitelisting modules and cloning functions
(OP4 and OP3) will remove lots of the added overhead for checking the target of
indirect CTIs and will bring down the average overhead to 1.22x. The last set of
optimizations (OP5 and OP6) detect safe functions and remove the check before the
return instruction in such functions. Thus, boosting the overhead to just 1.07x on
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(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 7.4: The Contribution of Optimization Methods in Reducing Overhead of
RL-Bin for SPECrate 2017 Integer Without Instrumentation
7.4 Robustness
Our last experiment is designed to demonstrate that RL-Bin is robust enough
to handle commercial multi-threaded applications that contain dynamically gen-
erated and self-modifying code, as well as obfuscation. We aimed to show that
RL-Bin fully instruments the binary and it achieves full code coverage, meaning
that no instruction is executed without being monitored by RL-Bin. The number of
dynamically executed instructions was measured by instrumenting every basic block
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of the application to add the size of the basic block to the total count.
7.4.1 Commercial Applications
Table 7.3 shows the list of commercial binary applications that we used in
our testing. We tested three popular Microsoft Office tools; Word, PowerPoint, and
Excel as well as Adobe Acrobat Reader, Adobe Premiere Pro, Adobe Photoshop, and
Apache Web Server. In our experiments, in order to have dynamically generated and
self-modifying code, we opened documents which contained VBA code in Microsoft
Office and JavaScript in Adobe Reader. Apache Web Server heavily uses multi-
threading, so this application would appropriately stress test the multi-threading
capabilities of RL-Bin.
For commercial programs, we did not measure the overhead, since interaction
with users and other uncertain factors, make them unacceptable as benchmarks
for measuring the overhead, introduced by RL-Bin. Instead SPEC CPU 2017 was
used for measuring overhead, since they are standardized benchmarks without user
interaction, making them suitable for run-time measurement.
The measurements on number of dynamic instructions were done with both
RL-Bin and DynamoRIO. The results showed that the numbers are the same for
every application in the set, thus proving that every single instruction is counted by
RL-Bin and full code coverage is achieved. As a result, proposed optimization tech-
niques do not result in any loss of coverage, verifying that RL-Bin instrumentation
is robust and accurate.
77
Application Name Feature(s) Size Application Area












1.3 Mb Presentation Program




2.3 Mb Video Editor
Adobe Photoshop Multi-threading 142 Mb Raster Graphics Editor
Table 7.3: Commercial Applications Benchmark
7.4.2 Obfuscated Binaries
Based on the study [50], we selected three of the most popular obfuscation tools
for our testing: UPX, PECompact, and ASProtect. UPX [51], short for Ultimate
Packer for eXecutables, is an open-source obfuscation tool available for many plat-
forms. It provides basic obfuscation techniques, mostly by creating indirect CTIs
and writable data in the code section. PECompact [52] is a commercial obfusca-
tion tool. In addition to the obfuscation techniques provided by UPX, PECompact
generates a significant amount of self-modifying code. The third and last obfusca-
tion tool used in our testing is a commercial tool called ASProtect [53]. It uses a
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wide range of control-flow, anti-disassembly, and anti-debugging techniques and is
notorious for generating binary files that are very difficult to reverse engineer.
Table 7.4 shows our feature comparison of the selected obfuscation tools. We
have also included a column for original binary files for comparison. As demon-
strated, the three obfuscation tools used in our testing deploy all of the challenging
features discussed in the paper. Hence, they are an appropriate test to measure the
robustness and overhead of RL-Bin++.
Code Artifact Original UPX PECompact ASProtect
High % of Indirect Calls/Jumps 7% 84% 44% 8%
Conditional Branch Obfuscation 7 7 7 3
Code Rewriting (opcode/argument) 7 7 3 3
Overwrite of Executing Function 7 7 7 3
Checksum of Code 7 7 3 3
Writeable Data in Code Segment 7 3 3 3
Functions Share Blocks of Code 7 7 3 3
Non-standard Calls/Returns 7 3 3 3
Flags Used Across Functions 7 7 7 3
Reusing HW Or SW Breakpoints 7 7 7 3
Table 7.4: Methods Introduced to Efficiently Handle Code Artifacts.
Table 7.5 shows the program’s behavior running under RL-Bin and RL-Bin++
in the presence of the code artifacts. As described, for some cases, RL-Bin can handle
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the code artifact but with high overhead. For other artifacts, the program behavior
would be unexpected, leading to a crash. RL-Bin++ successfully dealt with all
challenging code artifacts.
Code Artifacts
Effect on the Binary Rewriter
RL-Bin RL-Bin++
High % of Indirect
Calls/Jumps




High overhead (4x) Code-cache reduces
the overhead (2.5x)




































Table 7.5: Effect of Problematic Code Artifacts on RL-Bin and RL-Bin++.
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7.5 Performance and Memory Overhead for Obfuscated Binaries
In this section, we compare the overhead of RL-Bin++ with Pin and Dy-
namoRIO. Among the dynamic binary rewriters discussed in the related works sec-
tion, only Pin and DynamoRIO are mature and robust enough to properly handle
the obfuscation techniques. As described at the beginning of this chapter, our ex-
periment used SPECrate 2017 benchmarks with their reference data sets consisting
of 10 Integer and 13 Floating-Point applications. We excluded three of the Floating-
Point benchmarks because they could not be compiled for x86 Windows machine.
We compiled the remaining benchmark programs with Microsoft Visual Studio and
obfuscated them with the three obfuscation tools mentioned above.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the average overhead of RL-Bin, Pin, DynamoRIO, and
RL-Bin++. As anticipated, RL-Bin only worked for original binaries and the bi-
naries packed by UPX. RL-Bin++ can handle the binaries obfuscated by UPX,
PECompact, and ASProtect. The overhead for RL-Bin++ is lower than both Pin
and DynamoRIO, which are the most efficient dynamic binary rewriters based on a
previous study [49]. On average, for obfuscated binaries, RL-Bin++ has 2.7x over-
head while the overhead of Pin and DynamoRIO is 4.11x and 5.31x, respectively.
Finally, it is demonstrated that RL-Bin++ overhead for unobfuscated binaries
is 1.06x, the same as RL-Bin, while Pin and DynamoRIO have more than 1.16x
overhead. RL-Bin++ is the only robust dynamic rewriter with an overhead that is
low enough for deployment in live systems.
To show the effect of each of the methods proposed in Chapter 6 , we measured
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the overhead of the same benchmarks while different methods were applied succes-
sively. The result has been demonstrated in figure 7.6. It can be seen for the original
binaries, the first set of columns, that the overhead remains almost the same. The
reason is that none of the problematic code artifacts are present in unobfuscated
binaries.
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RL-Bin can execute binaries packed by UPX with high overhead. Applying
methods I, II, and III would reduce the overhead caused by a high percentage of
indirect CTIs, writable data in the code section, and non-standard calls and returns.
Methods IV, V, and VI do not significantly affect the overhead of these binaries.
82
RL-Bin cannot handle binaries obfuscated with PECompact unless methods I,
II, and III are added. The reason is that self-checksum is not handled unless method
III is applied. Method IV would help with detecting more safe functions and further
reduces the overhead. Methods V and VI do not have a meaningful effect on the
overhead.
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Chapter 8: Use Cases of RL-Bin
In this chapter, we demonstrate the capabilities of RL-Bin as a base that can be
used to develop complex analysis tools for practical use cases, such as to enforce secu-
rity policies. In particular, using RL-Bin’s instrumentations, we have designed and
implemented six analysis tools, including the following; application-level file access
permission tool, secure execution by restricting RETs, collect run-time properties
for end-point security tool, generating guaranteed trusted disassembly, debugging
and patching in deployment, and just-in-time analysis and optimization tool. First,
we have developed an application-level file access permission system that enables
the user to define separate access policies for each application. Second, we have
created a security enforcement tool that instruments the most common form of in-
direct CTIs to ensure that the program execution follows the intended path. Hence,
it would protect the application from being hijacked in those cases. Third, we have
developed a tool which extracts run-time meta-data from dynamic execution of the
application. The extracted data can be fed into a machine learning based endpoint
security tool. Fourth, we have shown how RL-Bin can be used a disassembler that
proviodes full code coverage without having any false positives, which is incorect
disassembly of data instead of code. Fifth, we have designed a debugging in de-
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ployment system which provides the unique ability to monitor the application in an
external environment and fix potential issues specific to that environment. Lastly,
we have shown how RL-Bin can be used as a dynamic optimization tool. In this
chapter, we describe each of these use cases in detail.
8.1 Application-level File Access Permission
The primary goal of file access permission methods is to limit unauthorized
users’ ability to read/write/modify files containing sensitive information. The unau-
thorized access could be from either a malicious binary or benign program. As an
example, typical ransomware attacks include encryption of the sensitive files on the
system. The files cannot be accessed unless the ransom is paid to the attacker. In
addition, in some scenarios, benign applications perform data extraction to gather
information about the files on the system, usually for statistical analysis and data
mining purposes. In the case of benign programs, the access would not harm the
user, but still, it is unauthorized access performed without the user’s knowledge.
We are not only preventing benign applications from performing actions without
the user’s knowledge. We are also preventing users from knowingly or inadvertently
performing actions that are unauthorized as per the organization’s security policies.
To deal with the critical cases described above, the user or system administra-
tor must have the ability to control the files that each application can access. This
capability is built into the operating system like Windows and Unix. However, the
security policy is enforced per file and per user, meaning that each user has per-
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mission to access specific files on the system. This means that all the applications
executed under file permissions of a particular user have access to the same files.
For some purposes, the OS file access permissions are not fine-grained. Con-
sider a scenario in which the user has downloaded an application that is only sup-
posed to access its own configuration files and never access any other file on the
system. The user or system administrator should be able to determine which files
can be accessed by a specific application. In the following parts of this subsection,
we describe the design and implementation of an RL-Bin based system that provides
fine-grained application-level permissions.
In order to develop a file access permission system, we need to have the capa-
bility of intercepting system calls. System calls are executed within the kernel and
provide many services, including I/O services that access files. For the rest of this
subsection, we only target Windows operating system and discuss the methods that
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Figure 8.1: How System Calls Are Made and Possible Interception Locations
Figure 8.1 shows how applications make system calls in Windows. First, the
application calls an API (Application Program Interface) function which resides in
a system DLL, usually ntdll. Then the API function sets the parameters for the
system call and calls the system service stub, which is the common gateway for all
system calls. System service stub would use either sysenter or int 2e instruction
86
to transfer the control to kernel mode. System service routine in the kernel mode
execute the requested system call based on the parameters that are passed and then
transfers the control back to the user mode. Although this is the recommended
method for accessing system calls, applications can bypass API and call the system
calls directly.
There exist three methods for intercepting the system calls. First method
intercept the API call. The second method intercepts the system service stub, and
the last method intercept the system calls within the kernel mode. In the following
paragraphs, we describe the aforementioned methods, and then propose our method
for system call interception.
The first method for intercepting system calls is to intercept API function
calls. In this method, the API’s address on the import address table is modified to
a wrapper function, which then calls the API. The wrapper function can analyze
the parameters and results of the API. This method, which is usually used by
patching tools, has two main disadvantages. First, using Windows APIs is only
the recommended method for accessing system calls. However, it is still possible to
access them directly, and this method would not intercept the system calls that are
called directly. The other disadvantage is that anti-patching methods bypass the
import address table and call the APIs by unconventional methods. In this case, the
patching tools would miss these API; hence not all system calls will be intercepted.
The second method is to intercept system calls at the system service stub that
is shared by all system calls. As can be seen in figure 8.1, all system calls go through
the same stub. This method would definitely intercept all system calls. However,
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it would intercept all the system calls and not just the specific ones used for file
access. The overhead of intercepting and examining all system calls would lead to
high overhead, making this approach unsuitable for deployment in practice. Later
on in this subsection, we show the overhead of this method for intercepting the
system calls.
The last method that we discuss in this subsection intercepts the system calls
within the kernel. The kernel code for handling different system calls needs to be
changed. OS kernel modification is almost impossible for closed-source operating
systems such as Windows, so this method is not suitable for implementing the
application-level file access permission system.
8.1.1 Our Solution
Our approach is an extension to the first method. We instrument the binary
using RL-Bin to intercept the specific system calls in which we are interested. The
system calls might be invoked either directly from the application or from the body
of the API function that invokes that system calls. We instrument both of these
instances to intercept these system calls. By doing that, we are only intercepting the
needed system calls, i.e., those used for file I/O. As a result, we avoid high overhead.
In addition, we do not miss any system call because of bypassing methods used to
circumvent patching tools since RL-Bin dynamically disassembles and disassembles
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Figure 8.2: Overhead of File-Access Permission System Using RL-Bin
8.1.2 Implementation and Experimental Results
We have implemented a prototype of a file access permission system using
the method described above. For this experiment, our environmental setup is the
same as the results section of this paper, and RL-Bin is configured for best run-
time overhead. We observed the applications in SPECrate 2017 benchmark and
the files that are accessed by each application. Then we implemented a system
that intercepts all the system calls and allows each application to only access the
intended input and output files for that benchmark. Figure 8.2 shows the overhead
of each application in the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite. The average run-time
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overhead of this tool based on RL-Bin is only 6% percents and it has only 2% extra
overhead compared to 4% overhead for uninstrumented binaries.
For comparison, we implemented the same method by using the DynamoRIO
binary rewriter. As illustrated in figure 8.3, the overhead is higher than the imple-
mentation of our proposed method using RL-Bin. As it can be seen, the overhead
is 24% which is four times the overhead of implementation using RL-Bin. Addi-
tionally, we have also implemented this file access permission system by the method
that intercepts all system calls at the common stub. It is shown that the average
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Figure 8.3: Comparison of Overhead Between RL-Bin, DynamoRIO, and Common
Stub Methods
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8.2 Secure Execution by Restricting RETs
A long-standing problem in security is to ensure that a benign program’s
control-flow is not modified. The primary method to ensure the application is not
hijacked during attacks is to use a defense mechanism called Control Flow Integrity.
CFI is one of the most effective application control-flow hijack defense methods
invented to date and has theoretical properties ensuring its soundness and scope of
the defense.
Here is how CFI works. First, the control flow graph (CFG) of the application
is calculated using source code analysis, binary analysis, or execution profiling. Then
CFI ensures that software execution follows one of the paths in its intended CFG. To
enforce this security policy, runtime checks are instrumented before control transfer
instructions to ensure that the CTI takes one of the edges from the CFG. The
target address must be the destination of one of the outgoing edges from the current
node. These runtime checks prevent any unintended control flow transfers during
the program’s execution.
CFI can protect against various attacks based on hijacking the control-flow of
a benign application. These include stack-based buffer overflow attacks, heap-based
jump-to-libc attacks [54], and return-oriented programming [55] (ROP). In any of
these attacks, the attacker needs to transfer control to the payload code that the
attacker could inject or may already be resident on the computer. During this step,
CFI intercepts the CTI, checks its destination against allowed destinations, and thus
terminates any attack before executing any malicious code.
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8.2.1 Existing CFI-Based Tools
The Control Flow Integrity scheme was first introduced in 2005 by Abadi et al.
[56]. Its goal is to monitor all CTIs to ensure that the application is following one
of the edges in its CFG, which is determined in advance. Their instrumentations
were added using Vulcan [57] which is a static binary rewriter. The overhead caused
by added instrumentation was 16% on average for the SPEC benchmark, which is
relatively high for deployment on the live systems. Some other CFI implementa-
tions have been proposed with just a few percent overhead [58]. However, these
implementations require source code, and the modification would be done as part
of the compiling process.
Others have tried to optimize the checks and succeeded to decrease the over-
head to just about 3.6% to 8.6% [18]. However, they still rely on static binary
rewriters, leading to the robustness problems we outlined in Section 1 for all such
rewriters. Using a dynamic binary rewriter to perform the instrumentations for CFI
has been tested [59]. The overhead was reported to be around 20%, mostly due to
the high overhead caused by the binary rewriter itself. As discussed above, there is
no variation of CFI implemented, which is both robust (i.e. not depending on the
static analysis and inaccurate assumptions) and low overhead.
8.2.2 Our Solution
Our solution is a purely dynamic partial implementation of the CFI method
(of one part of CFI for return instructions only) which does not rely on any static
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information or unreliable assumptions, which which would make our solution robust
and practical for all binaries. In this solution, we restrict the addresses that can
be taken by return instructions and make sure returns follow calling conventions.
Specifically, we use RL-Bin to insert instrumentation before return instructions to
ensure that the return target address is an instruction after a call instruction.
The proposed method does not rely on a control flow graph (CFG) resulted
from static analysis. Instead, we dynamically discover call and return instructions
and ensure the return target is an instruction after one of the call instructions ex-
ecuted by that point. Although our method does not implement full CFI, it has
some advantages compared to traditional CFI. The main benefit of our approach
is that our approach is purely dynamic and it does not rely on any static pre-
determined CFG. The policy of our method provides coverage against the main
category of memory-based attacks, such as return address modification and stack-
based buffer-overflow attacks. It would also significantly reduce the possibility of
return-oriented-programming attacks by restricting the number of potential ROP
gadgets. As a future work, there exists opportunity to extend this method to re-
strict other types of indirect CTIs as well to improve coverage of type of attacks that
this tool can prevent. In the next subsection, we would show both the effectiveness
and performance of our proposed method.
One of the essential properties of a security system is that it should not cause
false alarms, meaning that it should allow every non-malicious control-flow to be
executed without any interruption. In our case, we must not interfere with return
instructions expected to perform tasks other than returning from a function. To
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avoid false positives, we detect the returns used for purposes such as stack unwinding
and thread context switch. The returns that are used for stack unwinding are part of
standard C++ exception handling routines. Our method detects specific sequence of
instructions generated by the compiler to perform stack unwinding when handling an
exception. In addition, return instructions which perform context switch, only exist
in a few specific library routines within system libraries. We put all the instruction
within these routines in the list of instructions that are expected not to follow usual
calling convention. As described in the next subsection, our experimental results
showed that all false positives could be avoided by detecting and excluding these
special return instructions.
8.2.3 Implementation and Experimental Results
In this subsection, first, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the security policy
on two real-world exploits. Then, we discuss the effect of added instrumentation
to enforce the security policy and compare two implementations of this method by
DynamoRIO and RL-Bin.
Our secure execution tool is capable of providing protection against a wide
range of security attacks. According to CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration)[60],
56% of security attacks in the past year have exploited one or more vulnerability
that eventually leads to a stack-based overflow attack, which is just one of the classes
of attacks this method can prevent.
Table 8.1 demonstrates two real-world applications with the stack-based over-
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flow vulnerability. We used existing proof-of-concept works to perform the attacks
on these two applications. We were able to conduct the attack on the native appli-
cations successfully. Running the applications under RL-Bin with instrumentation
added to ensure secure execution resulted in all intrusion attempts being detected
by RL-Bin. In addition, the SPECrate 2017 benchmarks gave no false positives
executed on the reference data set.
ID Application Description
CVE-2009-2550 Hamster Audio Player 0.3a
Stack-based buffer overflow allows
remote attackers to execute arbi-
trary code via a playlist file.
CVE-2013-4730 PCMan’s FTP Server 2.0.7
Buffer overflow allows remote at-
tackers to execute arbitrary code via
a long string in a USER command.
Table 8.1: Two Real-World Applications with Buffer-Overflow Exploits
To demonstrate the performance of our prototype, we measured the overhead
of SPECrate 2017 benchmark applications using the same environment and system
described in Chapter 7. Figure 8.4 shows the overhead added by instrumentation for
each application compare to the native execution. As can be seen, RL-Bin’s instru-
mentation has only 9% overhead, which makes it practical to be used in real-world
systems. In comparison, the implementation based on DynamoRIO has around 27%
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of Overhead of Security Policy Enforced by DynamoRIO
and RL-Bin
8.3 Collect Run-time Properties for End-point Security Tool
As the program is being executed, valuable meta-data on run-time properties
can be collected during execution. The meta-data that is collected include indirect
branch targets, dynamic addresses accessed, exceptions taken, and the list of func-
tions that do not return to caller. These dynamic metadata can help in just-in-time
program analysis scheme (for example, a machine learning based endpoint security
tool) run concurrently with RL-Bin, or in offline program analysis run after the pro-
gram has executed with RL-Bin. Since this metadata information is not available
prior to execution, all static tools used for program analysis do not have access to
such information. Collecting dynamic information from the program enables us to
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have deep knowledge and understanding about the execution of the program.
Getting dynamic metadata from the program requires modification and in-
strumentation of the program which needs to be done by a dynamic binary rewriter.
However existing dynamic rewriters have two major problems. First, they have
very high run-time overhead. Second, they are not customized for gathering these
information. One may be able to use the instrumentation API provided by these
tools to collect the metadata; however, most of this information is already known
to the rewriter and there is no need for additional instrumentation from the user.
Therefore, if existing dynamic rewriters are going to be used for this purpose, extra
effort is needed from the user for adding instrumentation to the program. The added
instrumentation will further increase the run-time overhead.
We collect this metadata with the lowest possible overhead, in a manner that
is complete and triggered only when needed. There are two main categories of use
cases of the metadata extracted from the program dynamically. First, it can be used
in an endpoint security tool. Since we have access to fine-grained information from
a dynamic execution of the program, we can detect program-level features from a
program to detect whether it’s acting maliciously or not. Another category of use
cases is program analysis and optimization tools. Although several optimizations
are done before compilation, there exist optimizations that can only be done during
or after the execution of the program. Extracted metadata from our tool will enable
optimization tools to perform such optimizations.
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8.3.1 End-point Security Tool.
An example of a use case for the extracted metadata is developing an endpoint
security tool. An endpoint security tool is a software tool which monitors an exe-
cuting program at endpoint computer systems, and is capable of detecting malicious
behavior during its execution. Existing endpoint security tools collect both static
and dynamic information about the executing program. This information is distilled
into features and fed to a machine learning system that predicts whether the pro-
gram is malicious or not. The machine learning tool is previously trained on both
known malware and benign programs, enabling it to distinguish future programs as
one or the other with high confidence.
One shortcoming of existing endpoint security tools is that they only use a com-
bination of static program header information and dynamic information about the
sequence of system calls made by the executing program. Other dynamic informa-
tion on the behavior of running programs, which we term ”program-level features”,
is not collected. This information is not collected because whereas OS-level tools can
intercept all system calls at low overhead, collecting program-level features requires
a dynamic binary rewriter. Existing dynamic binary rewriters have high overhead,
which is not tolerable in endpoint tools, since they are used in deployment. Static
binary rewriters cannot disassemble code with any accuracy, and hence are not used
either. Hence no existing binary rewriters are used in endpoint tools today.
An opportunity is to use metadata generated by RL-Bin to collect program-
level features in an endpoint tool during the execution of the program being moni-
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tored. Some program level features are typical in malicious code, and can be used
as indicators fed to machine learning to increase the accuracy of malware detection.
Examples of this behaviors are self-modifying and dynamically generated code, ob-
fuscations, and packed code. Obfuscation is done by using instructions in a way
that is not intended. As an example, one may register an exception handler with
malicious code. Then use a divide instruction, which always divides by zero, as a
control transfer instruction which redirects the flow to the malicious code. Such
techniques can be easily detected by using RL-Bin. These detected features then
become inputs to machine learning to improve its accuracy of malware detection.
8.3.2 Existing Tools
To the best of our knowledge, there is no tool that extracts run-time infor-
mation, from the program. However, this would be possible by instrumenting the
binary by using a dynamic instrumentation tool such as DynamoRIO[42], Pin[48],
Dyninst’11 [49], Vulcan [57], or BIRD [61]. All mentioned rewriters, except for
BIRD, have a high run-time overhead, more than 20% for un-instrumented binary.
BIRD, on the other hand, does not support self-modification or obfuscation, so it
would crash for many benign programs that have these features.
Another method would be using a debugger such as GDB [62] , OllyDbg [63], or
WinDbg [64]. These debuggers are not meant to extract such runtime information;
however it would be possible to log runtime metadata by tweaking the debuggers.
This method would still incur high overhead and it would be impractical for use in
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live deployment.
8.3.3 Implementation and Experimental Results
We have implemented a prototype of our tool which extracts run-time meta
data. We collected the following meta data: indirect branch targets, dynamic ad-
dresses accessed, exceptions taken, and the list of functions that do not return to
caller. Figure 8.5 shows the overhead of each application in the SPECrate 2017
benchmark suite. The average run-time overhead of the meta-data extraction tool
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Figure 8.5: Overhead of Meta Data Extraction System Using RL-Bin
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For the sake of comparison, we also implemented the same meta data extrac-
tion tool by using the DynamoRIO binary rewriter. As illustrated in figure 8.6, the
overhead is higher than the implementation of our method using RL-Bin. As it is
shown, the overhead is 36% which is much more than the 10% run-time overhead
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Figure 8.6: Comparison of Overhead of Meta Data Extraction System Using RL-Bin
and DynamoRIO
8.4 Guaranteed Trusted Disassembly
Program disassembly analyzes the program to know what the instructions in
the program are, and is the basis of all program analysis tools. For many such tools,
it is necessary or desirable to have a disassembly that is guaranteed to be correct,
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meaning that every instruction in the output disassembly should be guaranteed to
be an instruction. In general at the binary level, instructions can only be guaranteed
to be so if they have been executed. Further, it is desirable to approach full code
coverage, meaning that most or all the instructions should be included in the final
disassembly.
Current disassembly tools are impractical. There are two main methods that is
used for getting disassembly of the program; static and dynamic disassembly tools.
Static disassemblers use one of the techniques mentioned earlier in section 2.2. De-
pending on the technique that is used, we will have either incomplete or untrusted
disassembly. The main reasons are obfuscation, self-modifying or dynamically gen-
erated code, as described earlier in section 2.3. Below we describe why each of these
features in code can result in incorrect disassembly.
Dynamic tools can extract the complete trusted disassembly as follows. The
method is to instrument each block of the binary code so that instrumentation code
extract the disassembly of that block of code. First, the entry point of the program
is instrumented. Then disassembly starts at the entry point and continue until
reaching a control transfer instruction. Then each of the possible target blocks are
instrumented with similar code. The instrumentation in the current block is no
longer needed and can be removed. The algorithm will continue in a similar pattern
by executing the instrumentation code when reaching a new block of code for the
first time.
However dynamic tools incur high runtime overhead, as described in Chapter
10, which makes them impractical for use in live deployment. Dynamic tools (in-
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cluding RL-Bin) do not ensure complete code coverage, but approach it since every
instruction that has been executed so far is included in the output disassembly,
which is good enough for many just-in-time tools.
8.4.1 Existing Disassembly Tools
The most frequently used tool is objdump [65] which is a static binary disas-
sembly tool which takes a binary as input and outputs a disassembly listing. The
two main issues for objdump is that it outputs the disassembly as an unstructured
text file which cannot be easily analyzed in an interactive way. The other issue is
that it might disassemble data instead of code, and it is common to find bad jumps,
jumps that are targeting data instead of code, in objdump disassembly.
Another commonly used tool is the Ida-Pro disassembler [47], which generates
C-like pseudo-code whose purpose is to aid in the human understanding of the binary
code. The generated pseudo-code is not meant to be executed, and often would not
work if it is attempted to be compiled. Moreover Ida-Pro is not fully automatic,
and may require human interaction. Further Ida-Pro’s disassembly output is not
guaranteed to be correct. Ida-Pro reports high disassembly coverage and the reason
is that they use many speculative disassembly methods which may or may not
be correct. For a program to be executed without crashing, we need a trusted
disassembly, in which we can ensure with 100% certainty that every instruction in
disassembly is actually code.
[15, 66] aim to achieve better code coverage by combining multiple disassembly
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techniques including recursive traversal and linear sweep, however these tools are
static and have all the shortcomings of static disassembly tools regarding dynami-
cally generated, self-modifying and obfuscated code.
Dynamic debugging tools such as gdb [62] could also be used for disassembly.
The gdb tool uses symbolic information or source code if provided, otherwise it
shows the disassembly of the instructions that are currently executing. This would
ensure correct disassembly since the instructions that are shown are either being
executed or have been executed before. The main disadvantage of this tool is that
disassembly cannot be stored in a way which is suitable for later analysis and also
this method has a very high runtime overhead.
Another tool which aims to disassemble a program is BIRD [61], a low-
overhead tool which uses a hybrid of both static and dynamic disassembly. Initially,
BIRD disassembles the program using speculative static disassembly. Each memory
location has a confidence score which shows the probability of that memory loca-
tion to be code. Later on, while the program is being executed, the confidence score
is updated. In addition if a new memory location is discovered as code, it would
be disassembled. If confidence score is more than a certain threshold, then that
memory location is marked as code in the final disassembly. This method does not
ensure 100% trusted disassembly; however; in most cases, disassembly is accurate,
Although the runtime overhead of BIRD is acceptable, the problem is the inability
to disassemble self-modifying code, no support for obfuscation, and the lack of 100%
correct disassembly.
MULTIVERSE [67] tries to achieve better code coverage by Superset Disass-
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mebly. Their approach disassembles the binary code into a superset of instructions,
and also benefits from MULTIVERSE, an static binary rewriter that is capable of


















































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 8.7: Overhead of Disassembly Tool Using RL-Bin
8.4.2 Implementation and Experimental Results
We have modified RL-Bin to output disassembly of the program as it is being
executed, in a manner that is correct and low overhead. The disassembly provided
by RL-Bin contains every instruction that is executed. This guarantee flows from
the property of RL-Bin that it monitors all the code as it executes, and never loses
control of the program. Moreover no data is mistakenly output as code, since RL-Bin
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only outputs instructions after they are executed.
We have implemented and tested a prototype of our disassembly tool. Figure
8.7 shows the overhead of each application in the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite.
The average run-time overhead of the disassembly tool based on RL-Bin is only
6.5% percents and compared to 4.5% overhead for uninstrumented binaries.
Again for comparison, we also implemented the disassembly tool by using the
DynamoRIO binary rewriter. As it is shown in figure 8.8, the overhead is higher
than the implementation of our method using RL-Bin. As it is shown, the overhead
















































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 8.8: Comparison of Overhead of Disassembly Tool Using RL-Bin and Dy-
namoRIO
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8.5 Debugging and Patching in Deployment
Making sure that the application is running flawlessly is one of the most ar-
duous tasks in software development process. In practice, it is often the case that
programs face run-time errors, or show unexpected behavior. The main reason is
insufficient test data sets for different scenarios. End user systems will have different
resources, and configuration. An error may arise only in certain execution platforms,
and never come up in development tests. As a result, debugging is needed even after
the development process.
Now, consider the following scenario. The developer has released the software
to the end user, but there is a bug in the software which only happens in the end user
system. The developer cannot reproduce the error in the development environment.
There are two existing methods to solve this problem. First, the program may be
executed with the presence of a debugger to find where the issue happens. However,
almost all commercial binaries are stripped of their debug information to protect
their code from being reverse-engineered. As a result, this solution is impractical
and the developer will not share debugging information with the user. Another
solution is to generate an error log whenever the application crashes and send it to
the developer. Log file may contain current stack, and the value of certain attributes
of the program. This may be useful to learn more about the issue, however, it is
too general, the developer will need extra information. In addition, neither of the
methods above would patch the code and solve the issue. Even if the error is found,
the user needs to wait for the next release of the application which may take a long
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time. If the bug is a security concern, it is crucial to patch the program as soon as
possible.
There exist tools in the literature [68] that would propose automatic ap-
proaches for pin-pointing the causes of the software failures. RL-Bin can also be
used as the base tool for instrumenting those application without high overhead.
8.5.1 Our Solution
Our solution takes as input debugging information of the program and any
arbitrary instrumentation that the developer wants to put in the program. We
recompile RL-Bin to use the information of the debug file and generate instru-
mentation that will be inserted in the target application. Based on the debug file,
RL-Bin would know where to instrument. The modified version of RL-Bin, dynamic
debugger, will be sent to the end user. Added instrumentation will monitor execu-
tion and send requested information to the developer. Thus, enabling the developer
to pinpoint the problem and fix the issue. This dynamic debugger does not reveal
debugging information to the end user. Only recompiled RL-Bin is sent to the end-
user system and the debug information file never gets exposed. Another advantage
is that the code can be patched dynamically when the binary is being executed.
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Figure 8.9: Overhead of Debugging in Deployment System Using RL-Bin
8.5.2 Implementation and Experimental Results
As a proof of concept, we developed a prototype of our dynamic debugger.
This prototype is capable of parsing PDB file format which stores debugging infor-
mation of the programs compiled with Microsoft Visual Studio. Our debugger will
instrument the program to monitor it during its execution.
We implemented and tested a simple use case. Ten random functions are
chosen in each of the applications in SPEC CPU2017 benchmark, and then instru-
mentation is added to report the maximum value of the first argument passed to
each of these ten functions during the execution of the program. (The purpose of
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our test was to measure the overhead, the actual functions and the way that it needs
to be monitored depends on the developer and may vary case by case.)
Figure 8.9 shows that the average overhead is just 9%, which means that
added instrumentation to monitor these functions added 4.5% extra overhead in
comparison to 4.5% overhead for binaries without added instrumentation.
For the sake of comparison, we also implemented the debugging tool by using
the DynamoRIO binary rewriter. As illustrated in figure 8.10, the overhead is higher
than the implementation of our method using RL-Bin. As it is shown, the overhead
















































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 8.10: Comparison of Overhead of Debugging in Deployment System Using
RL-Bin and DynamoRIO
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8.6 Just-in-time Analysis and Optimization Tool
Program performance can be boosted by performing optimizations that are
customized based on the input values provided to the program, and also the prop-
erties, resources and configuration of the system. The optimizations that can be
done dynamically have three main objectives: (i) adaptive optimization of the pro-
gram based on the input values provided to the program; (ii) optimizing the code
in order to effectively use the resources of the system; and (iii) performing program
optimizations that require run-time information, such as indirect branch optimiza-
tion for the common case, and program level inter-function optimizations. We will
further investigate one or more categories of these optimizations in order to show
the capabilities of our tool. We discuss each of the three categories in turn below.
First, program execution is very dependent on the input values provided. For
example, a run-time variable might be the number of times that a loop is executed.
Depending on that value, some loop optimization techniques may be done. Gen-
erally, this type of optimization is done by using the information extracted from
profiling. However profiling has two drawbacks: (i) it places the burden on the user
of the program to collect profiles and re-optimize the program; and (ii) profiling
encapsulates average-case behavior when run on a representative input, but does
not re-optimize each time a different input is provided. A run-time program op-
timization system at the binary level based on RL-Bin can automate optimization
during the run of the program itself without user involvement, and optimizes for the
input in each individual run and data inputs, rather than a single profile input.
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Second, resource-based optimizations can be done that significantly boost the
performance of the system. Programs are compiled and optimized for specific archi-
tectures. However, they’re not optimized for every end-point system. Just-in-times
optimizations can be done based on the resources of the system such as number of
processor cores, amount of memory, and network connection speed. As an example,
we can perform optimizations such as loop unrolling and function cloning which
boost performance of the program at the expense of extra memory overhead. On
the other hand, we may want to perform code de-bloating optimization if the system
does not have sufficient memory.
Finally, we gain the ability to optimize parts of the code using run-time values.
One simple example is that an indirect branch or indirect call may actually point to
one location most of the time at run time. This indirect branch can be modified and
changed to a direct branch with an extra check to make sure that the assumption
about the branch is correct. Such optimizations can help boost the performance of
the system, because of the fact that indirect CTIs cause significant overhead since
they cannot be predicted and statically optimized.
8.6.1 Implementation and Experimental Results
As a proof of concept, we implemented the last optimization described in
previous subsection. We used RL-Bin to convert an indirect branch or indirect call
to a direct branch with an extra check to make sure that the assumption about the
branch is correct. Our prototype will convert those indirect CTIs which have only
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one destination to a direct CTI. Figure 8.11 shows that this dynamic optimization
can reduce the overhead of Specrate Floating Point applications by one percent.
However, the overhead of RL-Bin for SPECrate 2017 Integer benchmarks is high









































































































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 8.11: Overhead reduction of Dynamic Optimization Tool Using RL-Bin
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Chapter 9: Application User Interface
9.1 Customizable Easy to Use Interface for Instrumentation
Having a customizable and easy to use API is one of the most important fea-
tures of a binary rewriter. Existing rewriters such as Dyninst, PIN and DynamoRIO
have expressive and flexible APIs [69, 70, 71] that enable users to specify instrumen-
tations at the function, basic block, or instruction level. Defining a general-purpose,
complete, efficient, and flexible set of APIs avoids the need for the user of the binary
rewriter to understand and modify its source code, a process that is time consuming
and error prone. The better the APIs are, the less effort is needed from the user to
instrument a program for a specific use case.
Our custom instrumentation API has functionalities similar to existing APIs.
However, the implementation is different and the main reason is that our rewriter
is not based on a code cache. As a result, unlike DynamoRIO and PIN, we do
not focus on trace-level instrumentation. The focus of our API is efficiency. In our
initial prototype, we provide APIs for the functionalities listed below.
 Program control and initialization
 Analyzing and instrumenting a routine/function/procedure within a section
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 Analyzing and instrumenting a basic block or instructions within the basic
block
 Analyzing and modifying the arguments passed to routines
 Providing thread and process support
 Providing system call support
 Accessing debug information
 Analyzing and modifying hardware and software exceptions
We have designed and implemented an instrumentation API for RL-Bin that
is both efficient and flexible. We have similar set of APIs compared to existing tools,
so that users who are familiar with currently available tools can adapt to RL-Bin
with minimal effort.
Custom Instrumentation APIs in Existing Rewriters
Most advanced binary instrumentation tool enjoy the benefits of providing
a custom instrumentation API to the user. Examples of these APIs include Dy-
namoRIO’s API [70], Pin’s API [71], and Dyninst’s API [69]. All of these rewriters
provide a robust and flexible API which can be used for instrumentation in instruc-
tion, basic block, trace, or function level. Pin’s API has some methods to instrument
child processes, multiple threads, and monitoring operating system interaction with
the program. DynamoRIO’s API can steal a register from the program and use it
only for instrumentation. It also provides some optimization techniques for reducing
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overhead of persisting instrumentation code. We will borrow the best ideas from
these tools in designing the API for RL-Bin. Since RL-Bin’s internal structure is not
similar to the tools above, the implementation of the APIs is likely to be different.
9.2 Example Instrumentation Using API
This section gives three example usecases of application programming inter-
face of RL-Bin: Call/Return Profiling using our function profiling interface, Basic
Block Counter using our basic block interface, and Conditional CTI Profiling us-
ing our instruction profiling interface. In the following subsections, we demonstrate
the result of instrumentation performed by RL-Bin and compare it with the same
instrumentation using DynamoRIO.
9.2.1 Call/Return Profiling
This experiment measures the run-time overhead added by RL-Bin when in-
strumenting the application to count the number of direct and indirect calls and
return instructions through the dynamic execution. In this particular instrumenta-
tion, the number of locations that need to be instrumented is comparatively low.
Figure 9.1 shows the overhead of each application in the SPECrate 2017 bench-
mark suite. The average run-time overhead of Call/Return Profiling instrumenta-
tion based on RL-Bin is only 15.5% percents and compared to 4.5% overhead for
uninstrumented binaries.

























































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 9.1: Overhead of Call/Return Profiling Using RL-Bin
to DynamoRIO which has 30% average overhead for the similar instrumentation.
Our experiment demonstrates that RL-Bin can be successfully used to add instru-




















































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 9.2: Comparison of Overhead of Call/Return Profiling Using RL-Bin and
DynamoRIO
9.2.2 Basic Block Counter
This experiment measures the run-time overhead added by RL-Bin when in-
strumenting the application to count the number of basic blocks that were executed
dynamically. For this instrumentation, the number of locations that need to be in-
strumented is very high. RL-Bin is not designed for these type of instrumentations.
Figure 9.3 shows the overhead of each application in the SPECrate 2017 bench-
mark suite. The average run-time overhead of Basic Block Counter instrumentation
based on RL-Bin is 72.5% percents and compared to 4.5% overhead for uninstru-
mented binaries.



























































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 9.3: Overhead of Basic Block Counter Using RL-Bin
to DynamoRIO which has 49.5% average overhead for the similar instrumentation.
Our experiment demonstrates that RL-Bin does not have the performance of Dy-
namoRIO when the amount of instrumentation is very heavy. The main reason is
that RL-Bin uses an in-place design instead of a code cache. As a matter of fact,
RL-Bin is designed for light instrumentation and the goal is to be deployed in live
system. No existing rewriter, including RL-Bin, DynamoRIO, Pin, and Dyninst, can
























































































































































































(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 9.4: Comparison of Overhead of Basic Block Counter Using RL-Bin and
DynamoRIO
9.2.3 Conditional CTI Profiling
This experiment measures the run-time overhead added by RL-Bin when in-
strumenting the application to count the number of taken and not taken conditional
branches during dynamic execution. For this instrumentation, the number of lo-
cations that need to be instrumented is fairly high, which RL-Bin is not designed
handle very well.
Figure 9.5 shows the overhead of each application in the SPECrate 2017 bench-
mark suite. The average run-time overhead of Conditional CTI Profiling instru-
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(b) SPECrate 2017 Integer
Figure 9.5: Overhead of Conditional CTI Profiling Using RL-Bin
Figure 9.6 shows the overhead of RL-Bin with an average of 20.5% compared
to DynamoRIO which has 24% average overhead for the similar instrumentation.
This experiment shows that although RL-Bin is not designed to perform heavy in-
strumentation, its overhead is still very competetive to other dynamic rewriters such
as DynamoRIO. Still, this type of instrumentation are not practical for deployment
in any live system. With this experiment, we demonstrated that the performance
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Figure 9.6: Comparison of Conditional CTI Profiling Using RL-Bin and Dy-
namoRIO
122
Chapter 10: Related Works
Binary rewriting is a well researched field of study and during the past thirty
years, there has been several major rewriters developed to address specific needs
of the community. [72] thoroughly covers existing works in full depth. Figure
10.1 shows the advantages and disadvantages to static rewriters and other dynamic
rewriters. In this chapter, we will dicuss static and dynamic rewriters in details and





















RL-Bin is capable of analyzing and instrumenting every single instruction before its execution. 
Even if the instruction is rewritten by the program itself, RL-Bin can detect the change and 
reanalyze and reinstrument the instruction, if necessary. However, if another process which is ot 
monitored by RL-Bin rewrite some portions of the current process memory space, then RL-Bin 
would not be able to detect that behavior and it could lead to improper execution of the program.  
 
The act of rewriting other process’s memory space can be done either by gaining administrative 
privileges by the attacker or done by using side channel or rowhammer memory attacks. In 
neither of these cases, can RL-Bin ensure correct rewriting and execution of the program. 
However, if every untrusted process is executed while being analyzed by RL-Bin, then we can 
ensure that these processes would not adversely affect the memory space of any other process.     
 
There are certain types of programs which try to use different methods to prevent their 
examination by a binary rewriter or a debugger. These methods are not limited to those binary 
rewriters which use in-place code instrumentation. There exist some checks that can detect a 
code cache binary rewriter. For example, checking the memory image of the program can be 
used to detect existence of a code cache. 
 
Here are certain types of behavior of programs that can cause problem for the binary rewriter.     
 
(i) Checking that the memory image of the program is unmodified using a checksum on it. The 
program compares its checksum on its memory image against a previously calculated 
checksum to make sure that the program is not altered by any other process or debugger. If the 
checksum does not match, the program does not run. This method is only a check that can 
identify presence of a debugger and would not crash the program or the binary rewriter 
unexpectedly. The problem might be solved by removing read permission from the pages that 
RL-Bin 
Advantages 
- Low-overhead for light 
instrumentation 
- Can rewrite every 
program 
Limitations 








Does not work for: 
- Self modifying code 
- Obfuscation 
- Binary file modified 
on the disk 
Dynamic 
Advantages 
- Rewrite every program 
- Reasonable overhead 
for heavy instrumentation 
Limitations 
- High-overhead, so can 
be used for testing, but 
impractical for use in 
deployment. 
 
Commented [RB3]: Need a reference. 
Commented [RB4]: Why is this not in the list of 
problems below? 
Commented [RB5]: This seems irrelevant since the 
binary rewriter did change the program’s functionality, 
which should never happen. 
Figure 10.1: Comparison of Advantages and Disadvantages of RL-Bin with Static
a d Dyn mic Rewriters
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10.1 Static Binary Rewriters
Currently, lots of static rewriting solutions are available including [14, 73, 74,
75, 76, 77, 78]. SecondWrite project [73] aims to recover compilable source code from
binaries, initially output as LLVM IR, which could then further be compiled into
rewritten executable code. ATOM [74] and Vulcan [57] provide flexible interfaces
for code instrumentation which help in the development of program analysis tools.
Dyninst’s 2007 version [49, 79] is an in-place static binary rewriter aiming to provide
low-overhead instrumentation capability. Pebil [75] is another static binary rewriter
focused on achieving efficient binary instrumentation by using function-level code
relocation for inserting control structures.
Another type of static binary rewriters include Etch [11] , Squeeze and Squeeze++
[80, 81] , OM [82] , ALTO [83], PLTO [14], Spike [84, 85] and Diablo [86, 87]. These
are optimizing binary tools or object-code rewriters. These static rewriters are not
particularly used for general instrumentation purposes and are mostly used in op-
timizations. The input of these static rewriters are object files and not the binary.
Hence these tools can only be used by software developers. As an example, Diablo
[86] aims to provide a framework for link-time program transformation with whole
program optimization. Unlike these static rewriters, RL-Bin is not dependant on
relocation infromation that is stripped from most of commercial binaries.
Static rewriters, including all of the above, face significant limitations due to
the lack of run-time information when trying to disassemble and instrument the
binary. The first limitation is that they cannot disassemble dynamically generated
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or self-modifying code. The reason is that these codes are not available before the
execution of the program. This will lead to incomplete code coverage.
Dynamically generated code is quite common in benign applications. In a
recent study [88], it was observed that 29 out of 120 benign applications contain
dynamically generated code, which is used for supporting execution of user scripts.
This means that implementations of security policies which use static binary rewrit-
ers would fail for 24% of applications.
The second limitation of static binary rewriting arises from the fact that some
benign programs contain data in their code segment. Static disassemblers aim to
understand the contents of code segments using two types of disassembly – linear
sweep or recursive traversal. Linear sweep ensures high code coverage. However, it
cannot distinguish between real code and data in the code segment.
To overcome the problem of data in code segments, another method of disas-
sembly must be used. This method is recursive traversal, which only treats a region
of the code segment as code if it can statically prove a control-flow path to it exists.
static control flow paths are only known through direct CTIs. For indirect CTIs,
the targets are not statically known and the target is only reachable via indirect
CTIs.
A third limitation of static binary rewriting is that some benign programs
contain obfuscated code, in which case static rewriting can break the program. The
relevant kind of obfuscation is control-flow obfuscation whose goal is to mislead
disassemblers so that they cannot reverse engineer binaries.
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10.2 Dynamic Binary Rewriters
There are two main types of dynamic binary rewriters: in-place designs, and
code-cache based designs. We will go over them briefly.
In-place designs, such as BIRD [61] have lower over-head in comparison to
code-cache based designs by avoiding the high overhead incurred by maintaining the
code cache; however, they fail to support some of the features which may happen
relatively frequently in benign binaries such as obfuscation, dynamically-generated
and self-modifying code. The reason BIRD does not work for obfuscated code is
that it assumes both the fall through and destination of a conditional branch are
code, which may not be true in obfuscated code. Further, BIRD does not support
self-modifying code. The reason is that once they disassemble code from a location,
they never change the disassembly even if the code is overwritten.
Unlike static and in-place dynamic rewriters, code-cache based dynamic
rewriters are robust and can correctly rewrite all programs. However existing rewrit-
ers have high overhead that is generally unacceptable for deployment on live sys-
tems. Two of the most popular code-cache based dynamic rewriters are DynamoRIO
[42, 89] and Pin [48, 90] with 1.2x and 1.54x run-time overhead, respectively, on aver-
age for the full SPEC’06 benchmark suite even without any instrumentation inserted.
Dyninst’11 [91] is another code-cache based design which has 1.2x overhead for the
same benchmark. Valgrind [92] is another dynamic binary rewriter which has a very
strong API for adding instrumentation; however, it has very high overhead, around

















































Figure 10.2: Comparison of Robustness and Performance of Static and Dynamic
Rewriters
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Figure 10.2 illustrates and compares the robustness and run-time overhead of
the static and dynamic rewriters that we discussed throughout this chapter. As it
can be seen, RL-Bin is both robust and also has low run-time overhead which makes
it the only practical choice for instrumenting binaries in live deployment.
10.3 Deobfuscation Tools
Research survey papers such as [93, 94] extensively study and discuss obfus-
cation tools and mitigation techniques. In this subsection, however, we only briefly
go over some of the solutions proposed to counteract obfuscation. Specifially, we
focus on low-overhead solutions that are robust and capable of deobfuscating a wide
range of binaries.
The first type of deobfuscation tools attempts to unpack the encrypted code
bytes. Some of the static unpacking tools use the X-Ray technique [95], which ana-
lyzes the packed code’s statistical properties to determine the encryption algorithm
used. The downside of these tools is that they are not effective against advanced
encryption techniques. The other static methods [96, 97] find and reverse the code
that does the unpacking automatically. Although this approach has been useful for
specific packer tools, it has failed to show effectiveness for a wide range of real-
world binaries. [98] uses portable execuatable static features to detect obfuscation
of packer tools.
Dynamic unpacking tools are more robust. Fine-grained approaches [99, 100,
101, 102] use whole system emulators to inspect memory write instructions to find
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the memory locations that are written to and then executed. The overhead of these
methods is overwhelming, and they increase the run-time of the binary by order of
magnitudes. There are coarse-grained dynamic approaches [103, 104] that utilize the
operating system to track memory writes and execution at page-level granularity.
However, these methods cannot identify the exact code bytes that were unpacked
and executed.
Another category of deobfuscation tools aims to address anti-disassembly tech-
niques. To handle obfuscation and the issues regarding non-returning calls, [105]
uses a modified version of recursive traversal with no assumption about the call
instructions that must return. Instead, it will look for specific statistical properties
in the byte codes after the call instruction to determine whether they form actual
sequences of valid instructions. While this method helps with code coverage, it has
not been sufficient for real-world obfuscated code. To handle obfuscated indirect
CTIs and increase code coverage, some disassembly tools deploy value-set analy-
sis [106] to find all possible destinations for indirect CTIs and limit the number
of targets taken during run-time. However, due to multiple obfuscation techniques
applied simultaneously, the analysis of these tools would mostly be incomplete and
inconclusive.
The primary method to address anti-rewriting techniques such as self check-
summing is redirecting memory read to an unchanged copy of the modified memory
locations. Some solutions [107] achieve this by changing the Operating System
handling of Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) to provide different versions of
cached memory for code and data. Another solution [108] emulates memory read
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instructions by using virtualization, which would lead to an order of magnitudes for
overhead, preventing these methods from being deployed in live systems.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion and Future Works
11.1 Achievements
A binary rewriter is a software tool that can change binary code (also known
as machine code) without needing its source code to improve it in some way, such
as in its security, performance, manageability, or track-ability. Binary programs are
widespread today in IP-protected applications meant for distribution to customers
and high-performance codes. Conversations with industry professionals have re-
vealed that they will not accept an unreliable tool that may occasionally crash the
program. Nor will they accept a tool that has more than a few percent overheads in
deployment use. No existing rewriter can fully meet these requirements. Thus all
the advantages of instrumentation and monitoring in security, performance, man-
ageability, and track-ability are lost for deployed binary programs.
The goal of this thesis was to gain the benefits of instrumentation and modi-
fication for binary code. To this end, we needed to develop a binary rewriter that
fulfills two main criteria: First, it must work for a different type of binaries, includ-
ing those produced by commercial compilers from a wide variety of languages, and
possibly modified by obfuscation tools. Second, the binary rewriter must be low
overhead.
131
We have demonstrated in this thesis that we have achieved the goal of robust-
ness. RL-Bin is robust, meaning that it can handle all types of obfuscation and
other troublesome features that exist in benign binaries. Chapters 5 and 6 have
described these features and our countermeasures in detail.
In addition, RL-Bin has only 4% run-time overhead for the SPECrate bench-
mark suite, which is low enough for practical deployment in live systems. This is
achieved by using multiple optimization methods, including a Just-In-Time (JIT)
dynamic analysis of the discovered code and traditional data flow analysis concepts,
to find ”Safe” functions and reduction of overhead by eliminating redundant checks.
In addition, we have in-depth analysis and exploration of trade-offs for optimization
methods to get the run-time overhead.
The result is the first In-Place dynamic binary rewriter – which does not use a
code cache – that combines the robustness and coverage of a dynamic rewriter with
the low overhead of a static rewriter.
11.2 Future Works
As future work, it is possible to extend the secure execution tool, described
in section 8.2, to protect all types of vulnerable indirect CTIs to increase coverage
against other types of attacks. It is also possible to improve the transparency of
RL-Bin by employing methods to conceal the presence of RL-Bin to avoid detection
by anti-rewriting techniques. There are also plans to improve RL-Bin’s Application
Programming Interface and extend its support for multiple platforms and operating
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systems.
11.2.1 RL-Bin-Based Implementation of CFI and Other Analysis
Tool
We imagine that RL-Bin can be used for the full implementation of CFI. To
protect all types of vulnerable indirect CTIs to increase coverage against other types
of attacks. To this end, one must find dynamic methods to restrict an indirect call
or jump’s potential destinations. Then, during run-time, RL-Bin added instrumen-
tations to ensure that indirect calls and jumps follow the restricted control flow.
In addition, we believe that RL-Bin can be the basis of numerous run-time
tools. The capability to easily monitor control flow enables the user to implement
new tracing tools, logging, and code coverage. One crucial distinction is that RL-
Bin has adaptability, which means that code analysis instrumentation does not have
to be permanent and removed after the goal is achieved. This would further reduce
the overhead.
We also believe that RL-Bin can be an appropriate basis for an OS dependant
in-process debugger, which can provide fast and flexible debugging infrastructure
from within the binary process space.
11.2.2 Improve Transparency
RL-Bin is both robust and has low overhead, but it still has issues with trans-
parency. Some malicious binaries use anti-debugging techniques to exploit the lack of
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transparency in instrumented binaries. They detect the presence of a binary rewriter
and terminate the execution of the application. In future work, transparency issues
would be resolved for sensitive binaries.
11.2.3 Programming Interface Extention
Our application programming interface could be enhanced to allow customiza-
tion of internal data structures and provide control over other internal aspects of
the system. This would enable the user to have greater flexibility when developing
binary analysis tools based on RL-Bin. For example, one can extract internal infor-
mation from within RL-Bin to develop a security tool with less overhead than using
our current programming interface.
11.2.4 Support Additional Platforms
The current version of RL-Bin is implemented for x86 architecture and the
Windows operating system. We tested RL-Bin with several commercial applications
and compiled binaries with different compilers, including GCC, MSVS, and ICC.
RL-Bin has also been tested with heavily obfuscated code.
As many applications are developed for other architectures and operating sys-
tems, as future work, RL-Bin will add support for x-64 and ARM architectures and
support Linux OS. This would further increase the usability of RL-Bin as a basis
for developing binary analysis tools.
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11.3 Summary
We have developed a new type of binary rewriter called RL-Bin that can
reliably rewrite all benign programs and incurs low run-time overhead. It does so
using a design that
1. avoids the copying and address translation inherent in code-cached-based dy-
namic rewriters by rewriting the memory image in-place;
2. is purely dynamic and continuously instruments the code to conceptually mon-
itor every control transfer to discover new code;
3. rewrites a memory block in the code segment only after it is known to be code
at run-time;
4. uses a design that adaptively removes code-discovering instrumentation at
run-time after it is no longer needed; and
5. uses just-in-time (JIT) analysis to perform further optimizations to reduce
overhead.
The implementation of RL-Bin is robust and low overhead and is well-tested.
RL-Bin’s design and optimization methods have empowered RL-Bin to rewrite bi-
naries with very low run-time overhead (1.04x on average for SPECrate 2017) and
comparatively low memory overhead (1.69x for SPECrate 2017). In comparison,
other dynamic rewriters have a high run-time overhead (1.16x for DynamoRIO,
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1.29x for Pin, and 1.20x for Dyninst) and have a bigger memory footprint (2.5x for
DynamoRIO, 2.73x for Pin, and 2.3x for Dyninst).
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